Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 924911cefa5ee35a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.3 KB Created: 2020-10-26 05:51:26 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-04
MD5: 163a18192275ff3d76f8dd17e1953827 SHA-1: 987a6508db2365865224bb2c5b40ce6ad696b2ab SHA-256: 924911cefa5ee35a0b818210b991f1cb437a03e211dcdc32ccdec5480f5e8c05
234 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, with one specifically identified as a malicious redirector. Heuristics indicate a social engineering lure, instructing the user to execute commands via Win+R or a terminal, a technique often used to bypass macro restrictions and download further malicious content. While no scripts were directly extracted, the presence of embedded URLs and the social engineering lures strongly suggest an attempt to trick the user into downloading and executing a payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/123?keyword=changing+pdf+to+word+converter In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4376088/normal_5f9646d7d60bf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372104/normal_5f93c7d761893.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4382197/normal_5f8c76f257d70.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4407998/normal_5f9589ec23ae7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366980/normal_5f8b3e486b357.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365542/normal_5f872399def59.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4376127/normal_5f8c8a58b8999.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374689/normal_5f8bbe9b8d621.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4414847/normal_5f959ea94be93.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wetuxabo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873937/6d7297.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gijakumode.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134306186/de42b88e27a9c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xawuwotogot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695388/mojir-zubowagopeve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://suganolorifumu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814011/58bb483.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://worozimovazez.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406108/2470299.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dimaxafazeza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453031/8767144.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://folukufisika.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384255/6bb06860.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kafasomawupi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775431/botuwoxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jifesu/digital_computer_electronics_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wazotojemov/lokokoru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/susopuzupure/august_monthly_calendar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/napisakaluja/gk_power_capsule_2018_in_hindi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/levumoduf/systematic_theology_wayne_grudem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fasanag/40032217511.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jarawaxanivu/articles_exercises_for_class_8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wumodukubaru/citoneurin_comprimido_bula.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mijedusovineti/vuxafakasi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jamokaroxoj/24610694513.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000063fc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x63FC 5264 bytes
SHA-256: bc4fb8700523ae03172522d24cb9e3b3a8695fb89489f267f187c809ce33bdf7
font_01_sfnt_off000075f3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x75F3 10924 bytes
SHA-256: d5110a7662967a915ac5ffb464ed597469bc71c5ed2e436ae3b5b2fb3d19802f

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