Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 92431af54254fd5e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.2 KB Created: 2021-09-21 03:35:49 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: a6981d7ed709e58acd1f2902464e6460 SHA-1: 0fef5c122267da76b37a7e29aca02b0ed8ccd20f SHA-256: 92431af54254fd5e0d60046f89fee45893e250d2fcdc37f6b4ac441e22134f48
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and numerous links to external URLs, many of which are hosted on compromised CMS platforms or disposable domains. The presence of ML_NYX_PDF_MALICIOUS, PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK, and ClamAV detection strongly indicates malicious intent. The embedded JavaScript likely facilitates the exploitation of vulnerabilities or the download of additional malicious payloads, while the numerous links serve as lures for further infection or phishing attempts.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://oniceh.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+make+your+android+phone+a+cctv+camera PDF link annotation
    • http://zopos.zohukum.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/wiwurogilobomovu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://panyuchen.com/ckfinder/userfiles/site_eachfun_com/files/6465302689.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cottonweb.net/userfiles/file/49818659451.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://militarynetwork.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16146a265ba3a4---98231154148.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nstyapi.com/resimler/files/8844664956.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nutritie-metabolism-sanatate.ro/app/webroot/files/userfiles/files/85950454259.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aquatherm-graz.at/files/54419221775.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--3bsx3iw22bmot.com/filespath/files/20210915084406.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wignaccent.com/FCKeditor_2.6.3/userimages/file/20210912215342.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://clinicaveterinariasangiacomo.it/userfiles/files/38324028800.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kaufdeinauto.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16140d81fc37c8---53493082709.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bibliotheque-des-arts.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/redigimol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://younewstoday.com/task/userimages/file/25555080780.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wideanglepackaging.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/97979279851.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hydrogears.com/survey/userfiles/files/viselugawoxaxinekoxarez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://superiorservicesandsolutionsfl.com/nbloom/fckuploads/file/xuzivisalagi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gzcil.com/uploadfile/files/94344480998.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cpc-serbia.org/js/files/fupuxekenusimiwilumuzepud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://studioriboldi.eu/userfiles/files/wolaganowidok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://belniig.by/public/file/letademixus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mitrasuksesku.com/userfiles/file/zukafixukoxisujebifukex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.whirlpool-beachcomber.at/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613fc101d1d16---87558122522.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://conomiya.com/images/uploadedimages/file/sebewosimorezukekulifej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://christschoolblr.in/userfiles/file/69830150684.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e347.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE347 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000fb59.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFB59 17888 bytes
SHA-256: e0ddfa2800c0c083dd06ab6c62406d00f9ca4b30d81e28daca77d76b95c092dd
font_02_sfnt_off00012975.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12975 11016 bytes
SHA-256: 56e9b770b530fd301b5d55d91736b412df7db33428e983ae576985b143ce7c2b

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.