Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9241daf53fe86be7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.4 KB
MD5: 5388657c9dde1ce6f13f2e69b04d4b41 SHA-1: 519e949517087b132fe962d056331912085851c4 SHA-256: 9241daf53fe86be7f738e43c07b6e7df92b8c804982eb6dcef55e19f81d1e85e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces the activation of this embedded object, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting older Microsoft Office vulnerabilities.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000085.bin
7176cc3bc4b8ad352818c388c953d7dfd250c261a8bf70b1f6ebaf19e708e906
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x85 1555 bytes