Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9214968229974850…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

499.4 KB Created: 2023-11-30 10:02:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 5cca7559186d25707d70e91da6865fcb SHA-1: cedfa7843dd0d312f1d0a0dabf699de5273e7f58 SHA-256: 921496822997485059ad137e7cd25060cbe6abc9466f2e33c1d7df01630737f4
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious OOXML document that leverages CVE-2023-36884 to load an external RTF object. This exploit is related to CVE-2017-8759 and involves an external OLE object. The primary IOC is the URL from which the RTF object is loaded, indicating a likely delivery mechanism for a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • CVE-2023-36884 — external RTF auto-load relationship critical CVE likely CVE_2023_36884
    Document auto-load relationship references a remote RTF file (https://sarabanmithnavy.tni-mil.com/importanmail/785871/file.rtf), matching the stronger Storm-0978/RomCom external-RTF delivery shape. Plain clickable hyperlinks are not enough for this CVE rule.
  • OOXML OLE2Link remote document — CVE-2017-8759 related high CVE related CVE_2017_8759_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship fetches a remote Office-looking document. That is the OOXML OLE2Link staging shape used by CVE-2017-8759 campaigns when the remote document/WSDL supplies the SOAP moniker payload; the local file alone does not contain the WSDL body needed for an exact match.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.