Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 91f9e5d3ad73c344…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.0 KB Created: 2020-12-04 03:54:34 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: e77cb1414d1db3a90bbeff4a007fd45c SHA-1: 3938e85ca6d4de369d1f76e8882fd140edb0b3f7 SHA-256: 91f9e5d3ad73c34459afdc3cd8db8e06d543b148af1f1ee33aac621814d82557
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded links pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure, as indicated by the PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK heuristic. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of malicious links suggests an attempt to redirect the user to a site that may host further malicious content or phishing pages.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffmen.ru/123?utm_term=data+mart+vs+data+store+vs+data+warehouse In PDF document text
    • https://mikutefax.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134866710/3b7ae9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://genunilime.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134344847/jogusafela-fizirutikosu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fidojosamesevuf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134594598/tezugexokeku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://panidulupeju.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969186/luxojafojeminatux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://duzufeto.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134734580/7348954.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jopojikifereter.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134519769/werigawogibupob_kovutun_madadaxeropati.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b1bce50f-9356-4ea6-a0c9-3a8982a74338/download_manager_apk_for_windows_10.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/51958d6b-4f51-4452-9841-f2dde3b873c9/the_enjoyment_of_music_13th_edition_test_bank.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jixerubowi/vsco_mobile_presets_for_lightroom_free.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/23859c15-1bb0-49cc-a04d-f4440a5d2b6a/domain_and_range_from_a_graph_worksheet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ee3ea935-77e1-451f-abd7-6c46c1f43879/88840935343.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sizadagazagaj/95845031521.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/21fd27af-7aca-4b14-905f-ce3ed877eb2a/www.hotmail.com.mx_sign_in.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/28165355-8bfe-41f1-920d-b4a6ec62a4f1/fejoduxivamagopiteximixeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/suxugipipolazog/whack_your_boss_game_jolt.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/22dd2d1f-2f50-4fc3-873a-6cf91c59113f/21474155123.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ce20.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCE20 5184 bytes
SHA-256: 1e8311e2704c83000ab54ce9449bdc8ac5abedf4c199147f25ef57d370fa3833
font_01_sfnt_off0000dfb1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDFB1 10400 bytes
SHA-256: aa0af91a6d3100475a275d7ad5de53fad33dd67b0a305159192ec78ff478d8da