Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 91cf1abe34a15d72…

MALICIOUS

PDF

119.6 KB Created: 2021-09-04 18:50:13 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: d9b1736543f41a4e65c34fdc744d6a3e SHA-1: 01b1e25871421f6304428bee7b1201b0f7bcb99d SHA-256: 91cf1abe34a15d72ba7e013d3920924a22cc8d2f623656e79d25003aeb4351fa
296 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and heuristics indicate it's designed to lure users into executing commands via social engineering tactics like 'ClickFix' and 'Clipboard command execution lure'. The embedded script contains text related to installing packages via PowerShell, suggesting an intent to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of multiple links to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting further supports a malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9990

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://xn--e1aaafipco3bk8gra3b.xn--p1ai/upload_picture/file/fumep.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://sarahscupcakery.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607dab4c1da1c---dubuwax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.lightingandhvacexpo.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4bb9a2aa8898d449b0bfdf9cb2501bda/60626631271.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://e2ingenieros.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/negafogafefeko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sanier.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/euq665uvr9sbm0upl4dkqan3r9/pedebefotutanez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vernadoc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4e747ccb5674c57a066e9bc87904468a/28523589564.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://retentionstudentexperience.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608a421b5e7fd---85227462170.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://weighlessthisyear.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/bokatubirerekovivoweralu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://terapeutickemasaze.eu/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ad4ade2805f---14539247169.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://waelfawzy.com/userfiles/file/zovaxegugamepenibaniveb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.medical-psychology.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608c02e1dee24---mabutiludowabujejezapiko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.auto-ecole-rive-droite.fr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/ferijedatifobux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://geometrarontani.it/userfiles/files/32396011432.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mirandatutoringcentre.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608a3433b3d80---tobibokudijefesezo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://protradingindia.net/userfiles/file/redegerubaxunazin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fst-uinsu.net/userfiles/files/remelusiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://keramann.ru/uploads/files/48654881247.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://law.myvzl.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/afr9vimf8bb7m9hd013fo0kegf/72648338603.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://maihiendanang.com/uploads/image/files/92986302092.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://altonika.pro/files/fck/file/kezakexedusubapoxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://logtech.cz/foto/Image/file/1166764902.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://galantemontagnana.it/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zajidamotiwelite.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hasici-pristroje-eshop.cz/files/file/leperogelubutomuki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/S30rS-6n6vg/uplcv?utm_term=install+nupkg+file+manually+powershellPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0001d8dd.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x1D8DD 1647 bytes
SHA-256: 96f528e9991d523127a392ec4bcad95b9031cb6de7edfefbc145619fb4c3a1b2
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Inkscape'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Goviwa Pagefojuzi</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Install nupkg file manually powershell. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;How to manually install nuget package powershell. Install nupkg manually powershell.</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Install nupkg file manually powershell. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;How to manually install nuget package powershell. Install nupkg manually powershell.</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Install nupkg file manually powershell</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Inkscape'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-01-04T11:50:15'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Inkscape'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='981a1383-8598-4449-a31f-ecc92ec8f848'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='e566db29-da66-48ff-a663-75eeec812042'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off00016797.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16797 20764 bytes
SHA-256: 9eab3930e6244388fa957f7d24fb92aa937657506a8b518c847711343b679b5b
font_01_sfnt_off00019e07.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x19E07 11148 bytes
SHA-256: 60676151ef6ea5589b3d1feda9eb7b42693c155b9e3bd2732478410b4149b4f6
font_02_sfnt_off0001b7f5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1B7F5 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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