Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 91c95a1039a1c231…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

362.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-14
MD5: a012c8c1fdd05e7cfee9645696677b6e SHA-1: 664e630dc0e3591279d434ef2f15bb9ccc5e4b5e SHA-256: 91c95a1039a1c231df73b0e4c6e603682cc6f2e5ef0f182e1b98621f41575439
132 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The sample is an OLE document that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via a URL moniker to download a secondary payload. The embedded URL points to a DOC file, suggesting a document-based attack. The presence of multiple embedded PDF objects further indicates a complex, multi-stage attack designed to evade detection.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://192.3.243.157/wd/w/NETISTNETSETINETSINSETINSETINSETINSETINSET%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23NESETNSEITNSETINSETINSETINS.DOC

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000817d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x817D 12100 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009f95.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9F95 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf
b1c79d64240c9eac60b88bc8257f494397bb1cbabf9a32642a99e0ec60c4b622		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00 367104 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006000.pdf
9cd726458aa85428eb01fd2247a73a399be2ccc0666d68511b9981fa7c501057		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6000 346112 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e200.pdf
d59664d75c16c2b336f3b75ee388eb6d5a69a64bd49cb7992a53f31df952aa92		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE200 312832 bytes

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