Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 91be953cec5f537b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.1 KB Created: 2020-08-02 22:12:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 5854927610d1f0e03065576ffb457507 SHA-1: 246000e0b41a8ff3a9136f60542d5687932089c8 SHA-256: 91be953cec5f537bf3b4778f7f7083a42c05f26c68b0925658aeef08f8c6c4d0
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains a heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link pointing to 'https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=windows+7+clipbrd'. Additionally, a 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic indicates the document instructs the user to copy/paste content into a command-line interface. This suggests the document's primary purpose is to trick the user into executing commands, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of numerous embedded links, many hosted on Shopify, further supports a link-farming or redirection-based attack. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=windows+7+clipbrd
    • http://files.shesinspired.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302824/subasolomati-lagosiwegumirer.pdf
    • http://files.thepamperedpuss.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163512/5496117.pdf
    • http://files.aknativepro.net/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874122/7214233.pdf
    • http://fefaxaw.elaine-yoga.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453054/viderux.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5530/0249/files/jejawufagumebane.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3006/8898/files/35799515283.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8052/3681/files/92235888599.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/8089/9989/files/xajobaferegizasoj.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/4430/7098/files/8430068872.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/1617/4237/files/cms_1500_fillable.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6277/1366/files/25059289217.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8042/5370/files/79659462494.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/3428/0099/files/fugilib.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/8438/9275/files/potuvada.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005dc2.bin
6b085c8160fc2c4ab36adb353a19b9be147e740a723c3ecaa4679badc1e12ffd
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5DC2 5180 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006f89.bin
88faaba89e49e6f9b4681ccfcf863077ac0fba9fbc69b5f2977f51b1b85fb226
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6F89 10680 bytes