Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 91b0eacb77a453dd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.4 KB Created: 2020-07-19 03:05:52 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-04
MD5: 5ec4fc44b817e03d64fa74992ec7b6a2 SHA-1: 9b35fd2cd2c01c384a12fe5c6c62eea4af3ed772 SHA-256: 91b0eacb77a453dd1aa8b6829c46899466b8ecfe9c2767751e582c0dc48e2d44
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a significant number of embedded external links, identified by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic. One of these links points to a known malicious redirector. The document body is heavily obfuscated and appears to be metadata rather than user-readable content. The primary attack pattern involves redirecting users to potentially malicious or SEO-manipulated external sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wb?keyword=vacuum%20oven%20memmert%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.stopdvnow.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437210/7392711.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.meridianbodycare.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857193/6976761.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.provodeckandfence.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739510/ea8832b133c8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.cjcsmembers.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070378/14d7b3b1bb6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.hsvb.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739918/zodafu-fobimate.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.karleneblandfineart.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776451/jekewalivumetek_benowapedaxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.noaries.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874110/dofagunef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mililaniphysicaltherapy.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740352/xafiwejeloz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://bolazeboju.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/50313065642.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sabuzulili.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/44549811208.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zabalime270743903.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/42459844941.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dedovirap.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/3642854089.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5650/4744/files/1273069039.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2681/6932/files/17478866281.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/5965/7374/files/14120228263.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/31052941417.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/3810/5000/files/pobonexopupagaji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/4495/3509/files/66201730724.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007218.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7218 4952 bytes
SHA-256: af23844c1a224d82bf95abf928e431a017536c070deaa6950bd335a08d3e36be
font_01_sfnt_off000082d1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x82D1 9796 bytes
SHA-256: a6167390e3bee7bc3b9b0583549d33e1048c67b8aac548483561f99be09f77a5

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