Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 918be69e74bbd00c…

MALICIOUS

RTF

48.3 KB First seen: 2018-12-09
MD5: 88bfe1a43761f04e06606bbb67825bb3 SHA-1: d056deb9225224a20a518ae96900c0e1c35dc9ee SHA-256: 918be69e74bbd00ca3c88abcedae592932bc024f698c526b42d8e5873e79970f
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics related to CVE-2017-11882, indicating exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution upon opening the document. No document body or script content was available for further analysis, but the exploit itself is sufficient to classify the attack pattern.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003e.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3E 4131 bytes
SHA-256: d706fca4bd9ca770d814b23f60acfa6d15aaefd53b89c3c41a5c5b17922cea99