Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9189d93f6db3ed5a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

227.2 KB
MD5: 3d9f3febf8957e6562580c0e131e6a94 SHA-1: 6d4bde3f3fe89860dba5183c9f07aa403fa2d479 SHA-256: 9189d93f6db3ed5a0147f73f089bc8aee1692871501deb619b5904f1511570dc
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers. This suggests the document is designed to exploit OLE object activation to execute embedded code, likely a second-stage payload. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic further supports this, indicating the document likely contains instructions to enable content. No scripts were extracted, and no document body was available for analysis.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
82716a87d212b30070a3ea565ce361df56fd9ea5d5f3b1db698c6f98d74c342d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 19621 bytes
objdata_01_off0000a972.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA972 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000bf15.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBF15 12297 bytes