Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 915deaa0d50a32a3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.86 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 8a5b1d4bd19cca893d10a088023515c8 SHA-1: cf64287508b08e691824a7f9916328098bfd6722 SHA-256: 915deaa0d50a32a34898ca465b842d325a8ba3be8c74e522f67daabccda9030c
108 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to download a second-stage payload from the URL 'https://peprolinbot.es/pupa0X?&second'. The embedded PDF also shows suspicious static findings. Although no VBA macros were found to be executable, the presence of an embedded URL and the exploit suggests a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://arpo-sa.com/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off000010ab.bin
41c2901ebda5b5d79d4a68e71278578ac4fe004bea942385b0ed0c502c07b584		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10AB 88240 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00136a00.pdf
c8a7f04e1bf4d500dfc8be89462e497d561a30f319934271c7390397b92583f9		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x136A00 677888 bytes

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