Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 914463a5eed99941…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.8 KB
MD5: 58aa4cb03af81cb0ebcbccb3a8ba6dc8 SHA-1: 299a2675f5d6c0d1b0777becab32704cbc9c6625 SHA-256: 914463a5eed999418d3201221fad54340c70cb8ce02c6a03aad35ad163f832b0
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of malicious intent, including embedded OLE objects and specific heuristics pointing to the Equation Editor. The critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and high CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED firings strongly suggest exploitation of CVE-2017-11882. The objupdate directive forces OLE activation, likely to trigger the exploit. The embedded object's ProgID, EQUaTIOn.3, is also a key indicator.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a6.bin
d611f3887159175a94f56cf74f6a7d7cf4075b853949d2ca67f25b8f8f835af2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA6 1644 bytes