Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 91413875076961fc…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.8 KB Created: 2021-03-14 21:24:52 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 5298cee90141e4c3f586d7fe77621a21 SHA-1: addd9d5c837457c8bc8c4213c05f974121044dc0 SHA-256: 91413875076961fcfdb7968955f034d7d12890dc8823c696b3e5a4aa89ceb0df
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicative of a link farm. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or SEO spam. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external URLs point towards a malicious document, potentially used as a lure or to distribute further malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://resalured.ru/123?utm_term=cell+structure+and+function+packet+answer+key
    • https://paxepufa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134640660/kodesakojajujojabuva.pdf
    • http://sapinatuligoro.22web.org/hospital_incident_reporting_format.pdf
    • https://fafixujanubaza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134096145/zimidad-lejuvaviririwu.pdf
    • http://pusudekevuwew.22web.org/how_to_edit_a_file_for_free_download.pdf
    • http://wulutano.mywebcommunity.org/how_to_be_a_good_dm_for_dd.pdf
    • https://xutonipojoneri.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134667901/zowika_jirenusovo_sawiwolikepip_rumavewima.pdf
    • https://setupazaz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134772318/7698442.pdf
    • http://lajulufubugo.22web.org/vokokidisolujibenoxenu.pdf
    • https://pafokosunokiv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134860442/xovoludazu_jinob_nivifuvabuwutad_gafasavefagevut.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://pekomuvave.myartsonline.com/what_type_of_charger_for_samsung_galaxy_s7.pdf
    • http://bidasumibave.epizy.com/tezoregemixuvaditafenat.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2b3a13c6-2b3f-46bc-9bae-074a1e44034a/79602641047.pdf
    • http://kawuduzan.rf.gd/astro_on_the_go_app.pdf
    • http://wexugemo.epizy.com/it_asset_management_software_freeware.pdf
    • https://a1c9bafd-2917-4c1b-b79c-a4b44a941470.filesusr.com/ugd/f0f215_6a00e1f0a77841e9a444a189a0b9888d.pdf?index=true
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/07e87016-2c17-4857-abed-50e07638dd3c/how_to_do_conditional_probability.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e2e6dc67-98e2-4f08-be04-31ea8614fcd2/how_to_measure_ratio_of_liquids.pdf
    • http://korotegimokuv.epizy.com/63701579345.pdf
    • https://e028ba52-6c86-493e-86b7-fecf7cd1c3eb.filesusr.com/ugd/bcb9fd_6f8ef8f2d9e54c08ab5479e1e5674a02.pdf?index=true
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e6d2.bin
2c202fae11ba7eb0eb866549f3e084bf8e0494c48ce8c804bfe7a61a2b679435		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE6D2 5312 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f90c.bin
347d52573ed4f7484b8ea6e22cee1ac9498f2c3e43525426a0e56cf5cac73726		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF90C 10728 bytes

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