Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9122e32c6d39fbff…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

111.5 KB First seen: 2026-02-12
MD5: 33ee00a706a4a9f36d2226bf281955d7 SHA-1: 6089cfb41c923d1cf57a3c4d2ef16e31d07cb849 SHA-256: 9122e32c6d39fbff3bb2623fffc020766b185c2392b15b24c739b9c9e1bc23a1
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, indicated by the RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM heuristics. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic suggests that these objects are designed to be activated, likely to execute embedded code or launch a secondary payload. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear textual clues about its intent. Given the OLE object embedding and activation triggers, the primary attack pattern is likely the delivery of a malicious payload via an embedded object.

Heuristics 3

  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000cfc.bin
af66d27ec87c8342f1ef1d56254293018cac6d6c2507de196cafe5c9b72b95cd
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xCFC 4191 bytes