Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 90f779825d89724b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.6 KB Created: 2021-01-29 14:55:42 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: ee1df6f34ad58a939a3532c0490b3b45 SHA-1: f482a440da410f80fedeef56213a19d9130decda SHA-256: 90f779825d89724be571c3a77627857ae4d7aa59153a3079c9c85deaa8b82bb6
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple embedded URLs, with at least one pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, classifying it as a phishing or trojan PDF. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains references to 'tnt run servers java' and application metadata, suggesting a lure for potentially technical users.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/wb?keyword=tnt%20run%20servers%20java In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tuxisilogok/jhihKrf/smash_hex_block_hexagon_math_puzzle.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tumowara/id4jcgT/tunnel_town_wiki_breeding.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://varijamali.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856150/jufinif_zazupakip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kenojulovananav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134016885/5796501.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tajiwikiter/MheHUpx/nasal_congestion_medicine_for_3_year_old.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://classicalnaturally.com/94661924040rec2h.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4417205/normal_5fdcb422dd34f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://devitigofe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070043/toluwawisas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tiporedoxuva.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740235/f79ca961d192d3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4420020/normal_5fd33579027a7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://kabudevegal.epizy.com/xumoputile.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vutame/aloo_matar_ki_sabji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d9e6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD9E6 4732 bytes
SHA-256: 3ddd0c3c9daa3951b241b7a35d5f2e7597876bc038e8af73a5eab1d2d4a3a15d
font_01_sfnt_off0000ea12.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEA12 16112 bytes
SHA-256: 7f00b64825f8d22c29b638afe86238e78bbbadf9477663bef5f755a058d1181d

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