Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9097d9cf5e6659e8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

39.3 KB Created: 2025-06-23 06:48:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-02-16
MD5: c9f3e6057e1809c10514f6a923a15860 SHA-1: 2dc99ef518c3c7fa62f26cd1cc6da9acb376b037 SHA-256: 9097d9cf5e6659e869bf2edf766741b687e3d8570036d853c0ca59ae72f9e9fc
422 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1071.001 Web Protocols T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The document contains a VBA macro that executes upon opening, leveraging WScript.Shell to create and write to two files in the user's profile: a VBScript and a batch file. The VBScript is designed to execute a command-line argument passed to it, while the batch file attempts to delete temporary files and then uses 'mse' (likely Microsoft Edge) to navigate to a base64 encoded HTML page. This page redirects to 'http://webhook.site/4ef62d6a-90c0-4a70-8dd2-468879c70fd6', indicating a download and execution of a second-stage payload. The presence of an AutoOpen macro, WScript.Shell usage, and obfuscated shell commands strongly suggests a downloader or initial access stage.

Heuristics 12

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Obfuscated VBA Shell command with URL critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_SHELL_URL
    VBA macro invokes Shell with command text assembled through decoder or string-manipulation functions and includes a URL. This is a high-confidence downloader/dropper pattern, stronger than Shell or URL evidence on their own.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Remote image (web beacon / tracking pixel) medium OOXML_IMAGE_BEACON
    Document references an external image URL — loads automatically on open, revealing IP address and timestamp to the server (used for phishing tracking and NTLM hash theft on corporate networks)
  • External relationship medium OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in word/_rels/document.xml.rels: http://webhook.site/c2e1be16-401b-4f60-8a0f-276b30417fda/docopened.jpg
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://webhook.site/c2e1be16-401b-4f60-8a0f-276b30417fda/docopened.jpg
    • https://webhook.site/4e6cf717-e4d6-4f40-9f2d-134196fa5e7d
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlst
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2023/wordml/word16du
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2024/wordml/sdtformatlock
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task^

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
e72a119c302fd4262798ac79bfa8427af514d3fb732ae45a542f03c951081539		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 7106 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
9795aaeb679fe0c76fd20f977a0a837ee94b86eef43a920f022cba3305538a78		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 19456 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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