MALICIOUS
260
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link
T1204 User Execution
The RTF file contains multiple critical heuristic firings indicating the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 via an embedded OLE object. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_RELATED` strongly suggests this vulnerability is being leveraged. The large amount of hex-encoded data within the OLE object (`RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX`) likely hides the secondary payload. No document body text or scripts were extracted, but the exploit itself is sufficient to infer a malicious intent to execute arbitrary code.
Heuristics 6
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Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE_2017_11882_RELATEDRTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
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Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITORRTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
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Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINKRTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATERTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEXRTF contains ~1979KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATARTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off00001dce.bin256bc4a482f734005b5085de90343bd37b78c33e7c61310a2035ef17a543e26c |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x1DCE | 989755 bytes |
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