Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 4

• exportDataObject + nLaunch — embedded-file launch-on-open dropper critical PDF_JS_EXPORT_LAUNCH_DROPPER
  PDF JavaScript calls exportDataObject() with nLaunch set, which extracts the document's embedded file and launches it in its default application. This is a launch-on-open dropper: the embedded file is the payload. No benign workflow auto-launches an extracted PDF attachment. (identified after nested-decoder de-obfuscation)
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
• PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
  PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In PDF document text

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