Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 907dc05a366ba32a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.3 KB Created: 2020-11-22 01:02:24 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 18b0df009514850c82d0cdbf4356ac6a SHA-1: 1c6cc2f412f7a0b4caae4aac12060c2f3904d7e8 SHA-256: 907dc05a366ba32a69a1c12aa208810e7f6f2e8f9dcd9151a257654270d2dcce
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO manipulation scheme. The presence of embedded URLs and the PDF structure itself point towards an attempt to redirect users to potentially harmful content or phishing sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafficel.ru/123?utm_term=bosque+nacional+el+yunque
    • https://tavumake.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740551/titefagat.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4418370/normal_5fa766f83eefd.pdf
    • https://retelajipubo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134700068/cc0b8ebe6cad5f9.pdf
    • https://xexinujufametu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134502762/letisajutoti.pdf
    • https://papunagaku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384156/xegav.pdf
    • https://dowamiwimeguv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775936/jituvuwemumuxa.pdf
    • https://wusunipusu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134320006/sixowijesa_kupenitalu_benebekejob_nebubawanaret.pdf
    • https://zirofapenepag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134855920/4736254.pdf
    • https://goneludolazoga.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134488647/rosogojepafoj.pdf
    • https://rosikotukixaru.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134312973/xipubifugikupaw.pdf
    • https://zadisoro.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134525292/xaridake.pdf
    • https://rokufekajo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814342/kekakoxagopofo.pdf
    • https://bidoruwo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134651737/mikobowe_lamozo_lojeziwenu_dilivu.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/52ca4539-9ae5-4fac-bf30-7293ff335afc/dulenod.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/30f4411f-65ec-4110-9d5a-5bb32dbd6940/fallout_4_guide.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f3c1.bin
48afe0dfe44bb52231a5a8ebc2d59d3c5281cff68f6f8073748265c3a107d4f7
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF3C1 4776 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010412.bin
349b2fad4650e573eabf82c7deaf711fe628acc63aacdcc977008a5e6ca8c292
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10412 16120 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000134b3.bin
b50a2106bf82917db0cd3cf88f63c5e8cc3298b343ace5cffc591b35df33d24c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x134B3 4324 bytes