Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 905bfb0b3148723f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.2 KB Created: 2021-09-19 15:51:46 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 44d69baea6527fe50f55ffa4769b085b SHA-1: 413faa959fff3bc237fce96602d46580c26b7f42 SHA-256: 905bfb0b3148723f05c8be7a9f2354bda9f027003c1f1894b088ce5d9c579349
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains an embedded JavaScript stream and multiple external URIs, including a link farm hosted on compromised WordPress sites. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or distributing further malware. The embedded JavaScript is likely responsible for redirecting the user to these malicious links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9951

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.lavalledesign.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16138ce61f16cf---motejedewovax.pdf
    • http://cohn-vossen.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161438c4c6bc87---82620828939.pdf
    • https://gjbuyerbroker.com/userfiles/file/94179317636.pdf
    • https://icon-studios.com/userfiles/file/96145322576.pdf
    • http://mezon.jp/userfiles/file/5432609080.pdf
    • https://epgeptech.hu/ckfinder/userfiles/files/dizota.pdf
    • http://peach2560.xyz/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/14567778460.pdf
    • http://artwatch.ru/userfiles/file/reposukapari.pdf
    • https://norservis.info/files/files/fagekuwilinuzenabesek.pdf
    • http://xn--12cfu9bc1efac9a9azfdsb7b9d1f0j.net/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sotenubiripusaxuzogakimol.pdf
    • http://paitoonbox.com/userfiles/files/sixizotozadaze.pdf
    • http://ladyvenus.it/userfiles/files/bazetu.pdf
    • http://qishuochem.com/siicea/userfiles/file/92904990512.pdf
    • http://witnesstherealist.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/db91c9f46fcfbfb005966ac0a7871f5d/73880782626.pdf
    • https://dalycity.com/wysiwygfiles/file/zokelonomabitanogi.pdf
    • http://cariboohose.com/userfiles/file/jenukodebafum.pdf
    • http://gzwep.com/img/file/2021910124359.pdf
    • http://strandedtattoo.com/file/bisomilivomazosimulorekaw.pdf
    • https://unique.global/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5398b447c8bb7157c1d4d335cf243437/50556156874.pdf
    • https://www.campacinter.com/image/upload/File/82795134194.pdf
    • http://sampoernastrategic.com/uploads/image/files/wanopixatete.pdf
    • http://saovietgroup.com/upload/FCK/file/60477425443.pdf
    • http://atrsara.ir/resource/files/97553920764.pdf
    • http://yuli-china.ru/d/files/73645108267.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=azar+random+video+chat+app
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b882.bin
e60916689919938ce1622ed7191b10841654102ead60d7edabe291ec1cbe85ea
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB882 10672 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d0cf.bin
8343af242fd1d4572575573324f2e283c0a27b9c07017fbe5107c7262870cd04
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD0CF 17932 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000ff5c.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFF5C 16792 bytes