Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 90572404433c6ba5…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.07 MB
MD5: 6353ad0484316bd0d808ac253ea3d6f8 SHA-1: ce7f5a270c79e8d2385d428b2423f4624673a9d3 SHA-256: 90572404433c6ba508bcb6401d41a692e659807741a340ddb274dc03ee0181da
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of maliciousness, including OLE object data and specific firings for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_11882_RELATED. These heuristics strongly suggest the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) to deliver a secondary payload. The presence of a large, high-entropy OLE object further supports the hiding of an executable payload within the document.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1112KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001038.bin
21b5887ea9cbf90bbf46fdf0df3c5f7560de13ac83265efc8cf35e0f34203750
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1038 556131 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.