Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9056cc6135c228f2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

32.5 KB
MD5: fb011f424e35d3bbe2ebb55295f6ddca SHA-1: f68ddc67dbe28c468f350c507fea2dca51414901 SHA-256: 9056cc6135c228f25d0222ac50d8474f8da6b2cf4c456f9ad0697b5fc945ce0b
60 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password and contains an OLE object, indicating it is likely an exploit carrier. The presence of an embedded OLE object suggests an attempt to deliver a secondary payload. Without further analysis of the OLE object, the specific attack vector and family remain unclear.

Heuristics 2

  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.