Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 — Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9007c4d4f1aa3752…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.38 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-16
MD5: 37aa56bfa94b385226709a1ae1e6fdd2 SHA-1: 56ba836b2db03506ad77b069b3123882b166414b SHA-256: 9007c4d4f1aa375270514ece55d4b0a316e77114ed74d7aa0e6997fe0a5da623
384 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: User Execution T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The file contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object is used to deliver a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, contains a direct link to a payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0' suggests a downloader functionality.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ole10native_00.bin
5ab498a7db13078e259f5d5f05ee509cc8e85dbad7329abdbbfc4607ad5a61b3		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0019B27D/OlE10NATivE 1680 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00081200.pdf
7f8ff14ee90e1e06f9f5481af271f8625615743a697e467e30e3434326308830		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x81200 920064 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
0b40fa62da9edb9a61d1780ee60eae3ee83f7fe42b1e11fc09c8da073e8262b4		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1444864 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006400.pdf
19c558c9b0279ef04d9d90865520fdc7c115a590efb6f47881e50ef4097797e8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6400 1423360 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
polyglot_child_pdf_off00018e00.pdf
84e4867017ad0125da70765e31feccd5c1abd9493178510b10e7b0cec6ea855e		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x18E00 1347072 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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