Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8ff9a79c19b4874e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

30.0 KB First seen: 2022-12-19
MD5: 648773dee72e63b5e3ec969bead7b9b6 SHA-1: 0ce1202faf9e9a3e3a30a8dfa52eb899ca5637e8 SHA-256: 8ff9a79c19b4874ed579b1b375f7f99bf16fefa998298b2ca6b93ce2b883dacb
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to bypass security measures. This suggests the file is designed to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability to execute a payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000591a.bin
3a4d116f5f8703547f97e5428a8bdea80dc7b75d8352b09afad89c206e16cc7d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x591A 1728 bytes