Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8feb04ef4f0ff3a2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

464.2 KB
MD5: 244199b0c7ef6095384008f8db439e24 SHA-1: 05940e60e759b1dfb6f61e18bd01d6f4fe9d909a SHA-256: 8feb04ef4f0ff3a283419c477ce8e7f4332a38e2463c2d8ad845831ed6e0dfbd
400 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document utilizes the altChunk mechanism to import an external RTF file. This RTF file contains OLE objects, specifically triggered by \objupdate, which are designed to execute embedded PE files. The presence of RTF_MZ_HEX and RTF_ALTCHUNK_RTF_AUTOUPDATE_PE heuristics strongly indicates a dropper functionality where the document acts as a container for an executable payload. The ClamAV detection of 'Rtf.Dropper.Agent-9965975-1' further supports this assessment.

Heuristics 10

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    (in altChunk RTF word/Colombia.rtf) RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF
    Document inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/Colombia.rtf) Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • altChunk RTF auto-updates embedded executable object critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF_AUTOUPDATE_PE
    OOXML document imports an embedded RTF through altChunk; the RTF contains OLE object data, forces object update, and carries a hex-encoded PE payload. This is a stronger compound exploit-loader shape than a generic altChunk RTF wrapper, but it is not tied to a single CVE unless the nested RTF object primitive also matches one.
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Dropper.Agent-9965975-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Dropper.Agent-9965975-1
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    (in altChunk RTF word/Colombia.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/Colombia.rtf) RTF contains ~2086KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    (in altChunk RTF word/Colombia.rtf) RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    (in altChunk RTF word/Colombia.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://opendope.org/xpaths
    • http://opendope.org/conditions
    • http://opendope.org/questions
    • http://opendope.org/components
    • http://opendope.org/SmartArt/DataHierarchy
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/schemaLibrary/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chart
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chartDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/spreadsheetDrawing
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2008/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/compatibility
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/lockedCanvas

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003a12.bin
25c58b6da32ff90d0415dee2d75cd99af8d3511d7e7789fe6f65bef2967fd0d1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12 464881 bytes
objdata_01_off000e7da6.bin
a45c0efdaca0a2ad8f8b9de98d34f6432587ec2f7cb51bd448e71833de1d402e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE7DA6 591442 bytes
objdata_02_off0021427c.bin
baa851e508de0c0fe3796025d004df72ceebc7132470d4cc307f31e2abe6c1fc
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x21427C 584266 bytes