Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8fcb4c9eddb66edb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.8 KB Created: 2021-03-20 18:30:58 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-07-13
MD5: e2f11036cb32612329bde3535c2470db SHA-1: a4b9b959fdd709228fa6628c7726243cbd434b3c SHA-256: 8fcb4c9eddb66edbfa2a3f6bf5af690da8467b78b4720457cf99b342bc7d69db
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains numerous external links, many pointing to disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or phishing campaign. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links are indicative of techniques used to redirect users to malicious sites, potentially for credential harvesting or further payload delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9957

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://botokaw.ru/strik?utm_term=dell+optiplex+9010+sff+manual PDF link annotation
    • https://titerafutar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775646/nirubudekogaliwuxuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bivesazi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134652180/f367e28.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sagupegijugix.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134443219/kugumeposuzo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://deduwewelu.iblogger.org/26285795303.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://puvomowaja.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134318832/bepedigaf_womejazu_sezenile_rozofizapu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fanamavikere.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134610997/fevorawoz-patoko-lalegav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tobivuzulukimu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384599/refebukudujuvi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bewosugug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814774/lozig_wosazeb_wazagedimefe_guxudoxide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kunaxujo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406864/fadomagi-todofula.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wowiwega.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453904/poturokiduv-penijogi-mamobaja-punox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://somusepuxe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070447/pikisukipajomamix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://1c019786-7048-4615-837a-ae53f087c4ae.filesusr.com/ugd/8b4172_f25afc4292d34cf589702423323b1cf3.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • http://zuzofigub.rf.gd/58297011717.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://694dae7a-2033-4a59-8b06-91ff4eec0774.filesusr.com/ugd/e1d58f_bc689938977a421eb9091f6b2c99b3cc.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • http://fawujuvuz.epizy.com/free_calling_app.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dc383e6d-b7a3-4e67-a88a-227fa542b6c3.filesusr.com/ugd/72b0e7_39a9fba3bd2d4ad49a220f984fddf571.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://8eccd3b7-fb20-4588-a5b5-4d8c58591879.filesusr.com/ugd/0e6328_6c87328ecb614744b95630389f94e6f3.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ea0ab71d-ea23-4219-a51f-003fa64bf9e9/vizilikivijufomipo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/cebffab0-c409-4437-8695-68c3dac4d6e6/cuanto_equivale_10_milmetros_en_pulgadas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fezenur/how_to_scan_for_premarket_gappers_thinkorswim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c0e269c6-dd15-40c4-815d-1b79d2301506/95181255833.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/serogajugomiji/84973121379.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a3f23192-c277-41f8-bd61-bb3d2227919c/is_california_republic_bad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://0926596c-b1e6-4473-87d6-fed2e709bfeb.filesusr.com/ugd/e2a635_c3e3c481ea0042e7909c8128f7389a37.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lakadutof/safep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d83f28d0-f743-482d-a16c-5274dad9de0e/laserjet_m1217nfw_mfp_user_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gotuziput.epizy.com/sovasusebidinexujaforaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fdb7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFDB7 5368 bytes
SHA-256: e3f40ec49f7a42399a9ff02e32ff4708024fd83f32d3bb6983b4512af02bb143
font_01_sfnt_off00010ffd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10FFD 12044 bytes
SHA-256: 1e315d5d085d7b1ea819233b0a1bd6e22028b8932dd3b40211e7fba2e6662f77

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