Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8fbf4febd5582de4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.9 KB Created: 2020-08-21 10:18:50 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 70854f827c7a6e9d6c4aabbc977a917a SHA-1: 21ad4a7dbc8a24b65c850e54d81ae0f3b83fd228 SHA-256: 8fbf4febd5582de4b6f6eb5fbf11ef048ee0534575d341af01512d3f1a2a3eda
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF file contains a heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link, specifically pointing to 'https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=truecaller+application+apk'. This indicates an attempt to trick users into visiting a malicious site, likely for credential harvesting or further malware delivery. The document body also contains this URL, reinforcing the lure. The presence of a large number of external PDF links, many hosted on shopify.com, suggests a link farm or SEO poisoning tactic to increase visibility.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=truecaller+application+apk
    • http://files.kate-n-mike.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873872/gejesikuxulolit.pdf
    • http://files.dkuntz.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814132/fekakojenajifi-wumaneju.pdf
    • http://wevasota.breakingbarriersoregon.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131378776/2640748.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/4225/9612/files/vajotone.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/9394/1671/files/7558806242.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/8556/8923/files/vebefi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8634/7414/files/form_990_due_date.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6556/3549/files/after_effect_tamil_tutorial.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/6321/2192/files/learning_concurrency_in_python.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/9219/5993/files/c_programming_for_dummies.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8022/8757/files/61491985128.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/1395/6006/files/tabune.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/9464/5672/files/mesufudu.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005f22.bin
229c43ee15823a3fbc2db66799bdfa0408bcaaecc046be7e0bda53c2ccdc55fa		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5F22 4764 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006f5d.bin
3ee4814f35e31c83998dd33957ca9277f5563a3433edfee13d4df4c5bb434bcd		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6F5D 10472 bytes

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