Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8f7259b8c5c33ca4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.4 KB Created: 2020-11-02 15:31:32 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: b4fc6731ac7184a9af27d4a67ce5e617 SHA-1: bc75068c7aee07f2a8611f88143b2b6bf017f3ac SHA-256: 8f7259b8c5c33ca4f96f2971cc7faeb982a11f5d7f754b68744f809ea1d26b38
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable hosting services, indicating a link farm or SEO spam campaign. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains URLs that are also present in the heuristics and IOCs, reinforcing the malicious link-farming and redirection intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?keyword=conan+exiles+crack In PDF document text
    • https://bakigimos.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134322269/tusifibawumikukudov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4378857/normal_5f8edf747f7f1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ganunuzarije.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134518475/1145484.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xojisige.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637148/2256539.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4423171/normal_5f9f6dd2dac0f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kadeborejegan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740978/9da17e4a6a8d36e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://putigazabikikim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682718/f63037cecb5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vodoxuzet.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681632/lofarokiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c249f4ac-2888-4eb6-9f51-82ed1d665fa1/51773542107.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/78d4eeff-0c6f-410f-a688-d55e020f2306/37786837687.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/488ba533-eee9-4667-9d17-2acf41d1320f/vrchat_custom_standing_animation.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0502/6014/8404/files/filogalevez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/415fb1ff-db85-44eb-83d6-ac87e04946aa/86800210686.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0499/3135/4274/files/pinalagemazogikagitunowe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006537.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6537 4832 bytes
SHA-256: cf3c0fc17b3d56f480af4b093e4800b8eca6f022b8210ee647a78a238f4aa4b1
font_01_sfnt_off000075b3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x75B3 12912 bytes
SHA-256: 545109a38c37758753e01a47b28d209dff46d214db75055e48e534eb07743ed3

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