Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8f6adbbbaf0b3300…

MALICIOUS

RTF

46.7 KB First seen: 2023-09-07
MD5: 5c2b9063897b742f636bbed0c5dc7884 SHA-1: 3404313219eee130dd02c51dca53fb9beae3d51a SHA-256: 8f6adbbbaf0b3300c19c11245feda8a509e65af72091eccb5d5009635986ebde
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body presents a lure about financial audits, instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic for macro-based malware. The presence of RTF_OBJUPDATE and SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristics further supports this attack pattern.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002760.bin
a26072d3dc3d123ca20aa76617419cd68be420d199b557808b25c0422dd16166
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2760 1615 bytes