Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8f4e297d5386475c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.8 KB Created: 2021-06-08 18:06:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-13
MD5: dfc56d8daf45bc35efc5bd0c05289f10 SHA-1: db0efe2efca434f0e9ad377aa009812f6d62777b SHA-256: 8f4e297d5386475cba43601429c28becb5a56819f3c78b5a073ef62dd0d256a3
234 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document contains a high number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The presence of a 'download button' lure and the ML classifier's high confidence score indicate a phishing or malware distribution attempt. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous URLs point towards a malicious intent to trick users into downloading potentially harmful files.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://inwebjor.ru/pbw?utm_term=norman+nise+solution+manual+7th+edition+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://zufulakoloti.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135301661/4026213.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sekawoxovezu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134018239/6268954.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bogonifad.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134108647/vetizuvafugo-bijopog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kotonimurapuva.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134440920/4574315.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vaxonarug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134378521/xezelebamafe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://baremilo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134234762/xezudilixifel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sofubile.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134380394/1e894e697.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xuduburuk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134323667/b26016bb6575b6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fuxexitir.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134098624/665c1ac5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zukodefikarux.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134498552/fakida-xupujetetufusu-sawifafe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vuligezu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135391643/9884708.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sesirolomozanu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132741009/eeb4735c0580de.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://tezalef.pbworks.com/f/tech_nivas_virtual_space_android_9_apk_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://funuvutidip.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144458883/mabuwenenovimodikaros.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/270219ae-42ba-4e4b-9bf1-a6c9afb52414/werewolf_game_cards.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8623adc1-fb08-41f5-b475-534cd9f110eb/r6_how_does_overtime_work.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b68ebbd5-5f02-4609-b555-66fdef07486e/puzavukenirusenamaxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c95c24de-d20c-476c-97b3-8a1cb545f3d4/89625402265.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b0b01f38-f2c9-4d24-acf5-70926475073e/radesux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000db3b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDB3B 5332 bytes
SHA-256: caaf752952abd291c1b627e84e26c30c9eeb7e37032c051503052637e9bf34f7
font_01_sfnt_off0000ed38.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xED38 10788 bytes
SHA-256: 4da064820c82f5543c5291d0227475f7c883ad90b3d577e3ae3dc3f39ce0c2c8

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