Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8f38bc8dd1825c39…

MALICIOUS

PDF

88.3 KB Created: 2021-09-19 23:21:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: 3f46482a4ef95c314b30c76c8a3626fe SHA-1: 1a1e4ea8bf9071ac828386d9d630529dca59080b SHA-256: 8f38bc8dd1825c39ac28764ec846724f99800584937446b281347ec29f8ad6ac
116 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many of which point to disposable hosting or compromised CMS upload directories, indicative of a link farm. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious. While no scripts were extracted, the heuristic firings suggest the document's primary purpose is to redirect users to external, potentially malicious, websites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9912

Heuristics 6

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://locke-3c.tw/uploads/files/202109021812109706.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://www.beverburcht.nl/upload/files/75576456577.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://discovercefalu.com/_data/images/file/42748874503.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://thokhoavietnam.com/upload/files/verobumexeseruzuropefif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wurstfargo.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/380f575ded355f87b218b820a8c0ea47/15102649099.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cristalparkhotel.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/65489823679.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://seeyounow.net/userfiles/file/lazupu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gyogytornasziget.hu/uploads/files/bomajige.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://winhazel.com/indigo/ckfinder/userfiles/files/57639630846.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lindendirect.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/jowumubem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://villadelauca.com/userfiles/file/wewil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kanoonkaraj.ir/dbmanager/filebank/htmlgallery/file///raxonovixen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://thriveelearning.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bf7d4e2dde733a40e456a0f8d8ad6abe/71344387191.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.tai.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161381b7582c04---puzutedorotamuzogegizizi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://haiannweb.com/uploads/files/52770408690.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ser-buk.com/userfiles/file/palesunitefabevizuzo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://posh.hr/files/nogova.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://metricgroup.it/uploads/file/guzakijivekebusenonebolik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://boras-sjuharad.boj.se/uploads/userfiles/files/roludotigeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://drvision.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16142ab0ed7e92---toxadetagomitarexerira.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bortran.com/upload/image/file/20210912035612.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vwtint.com/userData/board/file/41448378383.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://caigeshi.com/uploadfile/file/2021090620145973499.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ziconiavip.com/uploadfck/file/xafixuwi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dewalt-naradi.cz/media/upload/editor/file/5348665496.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://azco.friend-match.com/upload/files/58658861114.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/ngfLrbzwjls/uplcv?utm_term=latest+android+version+12PDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f5ee.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF5EE 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00010e00.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10E00 17568 bytes
SHA-256: 1c77a45000161a318cfb75c1a0befdd4bce8436ce9be27c39d7fc0ff3abef42b
font_02_sfnt_off00013b8f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13B8F 10388 bytes
SHA-256: 446adcac4457d39dee2d1d44cf80e4926b50b2f2c8801b37ab77463ef071de4c

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