Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8f28d8b7afa7e7a9…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.24 MB
MD5: e8ebabaaa691848e5ab454404595023f SHA-1: 0841820e084db511fa975f8dae790b20fa51b293 SHA-256: 8f28d8b7afa7e7a9a0fdf896c1d0c7e7b3a1fe26b0e3ebe4a3bd37f7b621e29a
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of ".objupdate" and the Equation Editor ProgID "Equation.3" strongly indicate exploitation of this known vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to deliver a second-stage payload, leading to arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
2c3854d4cff1841b2e31981cc483d20829987b6e7805ab72cac40406e03b17ba
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 27725 bytes
objdata_01_off0001d2a7.bin
05fc6d2b0a81484fefcb6cc6d4891013e53501190027c21cdd96bf0ea0957523
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D2A7 478713 bytes