Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8f1a4d895cba251b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.1 KB Created: 2021-09-10 20:56:12 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-04
MD5: 4f95b23dcde62a85f1c0ad098d80fde7 SHA-1: 6224f5dcb880f5331d9dbe4d150c7a03cc115c6a SHA-256: 8f1a4d895cba251b08fbf9e7260f701f36c06ba234f8b1cb9b6a72a2d802709d
240 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file was flagged by ML classifiers and ClamAV as malicious, indicating a phishing or trojan distribution attempt. The presence of embedded JavaScript and numerous external links, many pointing to compromised or disposable hosting, suggests an attempt to redirect users to malicious content. The 'Password-protected archive lure' heuristic strongly indicates that the document is designed to trick the user into believing they need to decrypt an archive, likely containing a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9981

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://wemservice.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/waxakutulovakavikonefuze.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://gemculture.com/userfiles/file/ratisadarusora.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.serwkom.pl/plugins/ckfinder/userfiles/files/98412937763.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://e-midas.ro/files/file/vusorarek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://distriparkbotlek.nl/userfiles/files/56655067057.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://teen.plovdivweek.com/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/40951118792.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://masan315.net/board/imagefile/file/xodes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://atlaskvartir.ua/data/uploads/files/9545224408.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ofly.om-digitalsolutions.cn/upload/files/suvorimalusekoredilapogor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://old.bgk-meshkova.com/ckeditor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zejirijavesola.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://joepromenshealth.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b96de0c4cc8c7629721df61a449e79b9/2437357260.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pololanna.com/user_img/files/renob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wajl.net/img/file/2021981718.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rajakeempat.com/contents/files/felevanepunivit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://triptoboloyfoundation.org/editorsfiles/files/tipedufin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://chrmglobal.com/userfiles/file/wolirer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kiko168.com/UploadFile/file/20210902033053466.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://icmasistemas.com/userfiles/files/rexumukenema.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://visualarchive.bg/files/fefitevogijedota.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pulsrmedia.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613135a806a76---73272596700.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sunaryem.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dclpd21b1a2lc8o9mktjlei2e4/72819555973.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://unaizahic.com/Files/files/novuwozumagelil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/ngfLrbzwjls/uplcv?utm_term=qr+reader+from+photoPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d70f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD70F 16884 bytes
SHA-256: cd29975362ad2ed1cd73c0fba0566a59c1e4e9fdb17e8bb858436c6710a48f4a
font_01_sfnt_off000102d0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x102D0 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00011ae7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11AE7 10412 bytes
SHA-256: 33215ad1432b549a672b82a2bef77e783b3bf28f44e19b9828c579b96835dd59

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