Malware Insights
The sample contains a critical OLE_VBA_MACROS heuristic firing, specifically a Document_Open macro that uses Shell() and CreateObject calls. This macro is designed to execute an embedded PE executable (embedded_office_00001923.exe). The presence of SC_PEB_ACCESS_X64, SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS, SC_STR_WSCRIPT, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY, and SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS heuristics further indicate process manipulation and dynamic library loading, common in malware loaders. The ClamAV detection of 'Win.Loader.Covenant-10058832-0' on both the main file and the extracted artifact strongly suggests a loader family.
Heuristics 17
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XOR-encoded strings (key 0x78) critical SC_XOR_ENCODEDFound 1 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0x78: 'VirtualAlloc'
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Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLShell() call in VBA
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Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXEMZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
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ClamAV: Win.Loader.Covenant-10058832-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Loader.Covenant-10058832-0
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ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAVClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
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PEB access via GS segment (x64) high SC_PEB_ACCESS_X64PEB access via GS segment (x64)
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Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESSReference to CreateProcess API
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Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPTReference to Windows Script Host
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Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARYReference to LoadLibrary API
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Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESSReference to GetProcAddress API
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Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macro
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject call
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VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRONEnviron() call (env variable access)
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas3b3db3a5fb8b3d6afc4fe50b0e94121d6cac558c91ade37b9a7411e36d0d9f28 |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 5488 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
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embedded_office_00001923.exea4e865d62d57fffc62c8528ba244b8493ddc34f272b0473295ee1a4c84694ec2 |
embedded-pe | Office MZ+PE at offset 0x1923 | 774877 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Loader.Covenant-10058832-0
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms. Carved artifact entropy is 7.65, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
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