PDF malware analysis — malicious · 8efad80f6d4e8675

MALICIOUS

PDF

93.7 KB Created: ¢m003Ão>ÎÊQü°rbÁ×+Ç@½ First seen: 2026-05-10

MD5: 89ecd0c60cd241d4c1cae8199e228a7d SHA-1: 3c6610aad6de5eb54f48930069880ce1896e83f7 SHA-256: 8efad80f6d4e8675cc3e89f179bd4ddc8e333bed734fbdab2fcb45fe913bd405

152 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file is encrypted and contains embedded JavaScript, indicating an attempt to obscure its true content and functionality. The presence of JavaScript actions and streams, coupled with encryption, suggests the file is designed to bypass static analysis and potentially deliver a malicious payload. The exact nature of the payload is hidden due to encryption and obfuscation.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 7

JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER

PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Encrypted PDF carries /JavaScript — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS

PDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/JavaScript). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://www.cadkas.com In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0026_000.js`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 26 at offset 0x99E7	42 bytes
SHA-256: `76e21958c55cd739dc2b69ddc0b41e5d5cf8ff3ddaccfc6393f1aec9622bde05`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script eval("eval(\""+getField("e").value+"\")");
`javascript_obj0032_000.js`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 32 at offset 0x2038	42 bytes
SHA-256: `4da4f73f6618057b400e95eb90896b30eebd559b412ef35499db75cc5f969607`
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script � ��< ˈ Ԙy.[�o��'I�<^L�X*�= y��

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