Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8ee0a2d473b6810e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

716.0 KB Created: 2008-01-30 23:15:43 Authoring application: WPS Office 个人版
MD5: 3b9c9e17cd3d07c43d8bc7611a4e3314 SHA-1: 82802bdc94775624369507b400fbb9da41318cdd SHA-256: 8ee0a2d473b6810e961f392ef6b2cb901ef50b671bed91e807afff03595eb536
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an OLE document with a high slack space anomaly, suggesting hidden or packed content. The PEB access heuristic indicates potential anti-analysis or evasion techniques. No VBA macros were extractable, and all URLs were confirmed benign. The attack pattern is inferred from the heuristics, pointing towards a malicious document designed to exploit or deliver a payload, but the specific mechanism is unclear due to the lack of extractable scripts or malicious URLs.

Heuristics 4

  • PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESS
    PEB access via FS segment (x86)
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 733,184 bytes but its declared streams total only 4,385 bytes — 728,799 bytes (99%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.microsoft.com
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa
    • http://ocsp.verisign.com/ocsp/status0
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA.crl0

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