Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8edce2cc553f735e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.9 KB
MD5: cbfdcebb7a44537f679f23054fdcf13e SHA-1: 255a551d655ad20df3093109a34b276ea264df27 SHA-256: 8edce2cc553f735e4dca2a09eb999665c9d6bd8b60f37d83b08c1ed0c9cba652
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor. The critical firing 'RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR' and high firing 'CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED' strongly indicate exploitation of the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the embedded object is activated, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000092.bin
39501db7f5b86bac1afeb33e3bcc7f02d55109a8b6c7ebd513ed135625845199
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x92 1746 bytes