Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8eccd9292abd57bc…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.5 KB
MD5: a26039099d1d9d0f1ba8a28aa3709732 SHA-1: 9070bde88a4b1bbf35900ba63cd4c25e5e8a56c3 SHA-256: 8eccd9292abd57bcd0428184171207d63293c0e8cee67f5d196dad4f4f5d8065
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF file contains a critical heuristic indicating exploitation of CVE-2010-0188 via an XFA form. This exploit is known to deliver a second-stage payload. The presence of embedded script payloads within the XFA form further supports the malicious intent. No specific malware family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with exploit-based document delivery.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
9ff170ddbbbcb6855b2b729c94719f381486a0b15a073e10e9a8c6658cdb70a4		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101100 bytes

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