Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8ebb1e0bd3a39c4a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.4 KB Created: 2021-02-23 13:08:05 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 397d64da0e809e81945632da63fd40d8 SHA-1: 0f334d3bd4e29871a6170a9ea3a0a9cb47dbe1d1 SHA-256: 8ebb1e0bd3a39c4afa1b1a6601b70110deb034563a65dff0a786467694f797dc
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded links that redirect to a known malicious domain, as indicated by the PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK heuristic. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious. The document body, though partially corrupted, contains text related to 'gearbox' and 'wkhtmltopdf', suggesting a potential lure to a technical or informational topic to mask the malicious intent of the embedded link.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/aws?utm_term=what+are+the+different+types+of+gearbox In PDF document text
    • https://zelekunidos.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682808/ea3afb3c333c3f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tononapiwaso/jj6Ta7C/lixovomegowemegudix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/rujiwujik/jgt0jfG/stay_alive_hamilton_lyrics.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jigekuragige/txjgRie/cruise_vacation_planner_near_me.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/mevexobuzur/iHCjhCp/utah_national_parks_road_trip_planner.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vujufosidomo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131482916/6263216.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rujuzodojavumip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134726220/c8242.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/bufutoje/ihjgdLW/godadenidakeromenup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ziresaro.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134509830/derofopulokejaja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://damanula.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856109/pofogazolawimafid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wuvexudid/Nggjh9x/15364808680.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xejinifinedi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135305438/3413502.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/baposivarabuj/jewupazofuxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/setikizo/gufevej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d003.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD003 5592 bytes
SHA-256: 7386a72cf0499e76bf0c977087153b50764909bc598efee6bf49d45f83488b2d
font_01_sfnt_off0000e31a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE31A 9940 bytes
SHA-256: f29d9d2150df0334406dd6629a8f80982af229335bc31a9302466f739178c258

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