Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8e8998bd2defe6f0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

112.3 KB Created: 2021-09-05 06:48:40 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: 84f12b9feacce43312a0dd3369b3f8f0 SHA-1: 54eadc341251ce4ed545e96b245f65f569c8f620 SHA-256: 8e8998bd2defe6f0a9a544fae031d4d83fbea226c5780b18b2c1fc17707a60c5
356 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1539 Steal or Forge Credentials

This PDF document employs multiple lures to deceive the user into revealing sensitive information. It presents a fake CAPTCHA or human verification prompt, a password-protected archive handoff, and specifically requests recovery secrets or MFA codes. The presence of numerous links to potentially compromised CMS upload storage and disposable hosting suggests a phishing campaign aimed at harvesting credentials or recovery secrets.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9981

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE
    Document requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
  • Fake CAPTCHA / human verification prompt high SE_FAKE_CAPTCHA
    Document displays a fake CAPTCHA or human-verification prompt — used to trick users into running commands or pressing keyboard shortcuts
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LURE
    Document asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://yorktownhs1987.com/clients/57482/File/32164959014.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://phu-komplex.pl/pliki/file/90083471775.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://classofjoy.com/KK/userfiles/files/rokep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.accidentinjurylascruces.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9q8j16sd9frnenimhffsn6sh16/ziwoworidiraredizofabu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://konberdbio.com/upload/files/59491849508.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://medgarlci.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/249bc7b91ec9f5551beeb1b47d468234/vifenuvusijewadagamo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nuyewrecruitment.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9883fa278658c2131efa0e4fc48fd14c/jujurozivas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://snap-drone.com/userfiles/file/wodaluge.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://yastudio.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/83e4fc233f4566f4588b5a1d293f15f7/zitaziziju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ebanksunited.com/clients/7/7d/7da19d52c1086e69e61582739ce98a0f/File/59625059482.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://unique.global/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/17fe60af01f4e764baf87ee7eb71d3d2/lixuzevexatelomarexomej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://boilerservis.ru/uploads/files/91149233394.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://skolicka.eu/foto/images/file/xureresifapuwenukapu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://staresecurity.com/userfiles/file/77401578869.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://btcauction.vn/hinhanh/file/42718937577.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://californiaoptionsrealestate.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/03971fc682819265e7fc349a369ef53b/tegigotixurizatatawuruni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://asijskepotraviny.cz/files/file/91077780432.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://studiogallerani.it/userfiles/files/zetid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.segurosfacility.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a70f23c2abb---puromijezekufutobofubaxed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://foire-fromages-et-vins.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160850e1beba19---97403459457.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://edoxmarketing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/l5qv5bonb8b6gohdo4ltef4ols/56613359034.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://homini.eu/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160761b9f89abc---20924991404.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://azizavacanze.com/userfiles/files/51461326292.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/BkSY9tpko7c/uplcv?utm_term=manual+entry+key+google+authenticatorPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00014603.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14603 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00015e1a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15E1A 10640 bytes
SHA-256: b802e9ad13b53ab25dd1e97d1e603d796f18d4c834c92b7a0f0aa0ec4958ad5a
font_02_sfnt_off0001766d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1766D 23036 bytes
SHA-256: 730da959a72c7c10bc69f993b936c55f04af9e600867c349cdc4875e5d442f49

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