RTF malware analysis — malicious · 8e7353b1da1a003c

MALICIOUS

RTF

53.2 KB First seen: 2023-09-08

MD5: 548f84f05be51a9796510945dfd8928e SHA-1: d85829ec62c9476ac1f6ca41a0d690a21a4ffcfc SHA-256: 8e7353b1da1a003ce62a7482f5da67fd75ecd2d762565e63b210a385b8ef0fe3

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object specifically identified as an Equation Editor exploit, indicated by the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic suggests the document prompts the user to enable editing, which would activate the OLE object. This combination strongly points to a classic exploit delivery mechanism, likely aiming to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00002cc7.bin` `fe0966769f5d79b11b2d73cde3c6db7384afbfa7a8951eb00be130564434fe2c`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2CC7	1776 bytes

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