Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8e63eab37aa65c84…

MALICIOUS

PDF

411.7 KB Created: 2008-01-30 12:43:16 +01:00 Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 6.0 for PowerPoint (via Acrobat Distiller 6.0 (Windows))
MD5: 6c0f5c4fba22324005dbfc68a6587439 SHA-1: 3028cd04a2bb2fa4915524141bffd6dec688a148 SHA-256: 8e63eab37aa65c84131d7bb81ac11ef335f3dce05be01990f78da7324ecfffc2
432 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a launch action that executes cmd.exe. The critical heuristic PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS indicates that the launch action is paired with a dropper API, and PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD confirms an embedded Windows executable payload. The embedded file is named 'tema3.pdf' but is detected as a Windows executable, indicating a masquerading attempt. The ClamAV detection further confirms its malicious nature as Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7281690-0.

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\tema3.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7281690-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7281690-0
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Optional Content Group with action trigger low PDF_OPTIONAL_CONTENT
    Optional Content Group (layer) co-occurs with an action trigger — content can be selectively hidden from viewers or scanners while the action still fires on open
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
tema3.pdf
18c0e6af562ec22e70745e9ec1964ebba9307ba1db208b6a3fd1889b77d18a1d		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 802 at offset 0x65DF5 5120 bytes
javascript_obj0803_000.js
901c2ee096069106d88276420f30ca640610a25f42d12cfd1a5df814f197a4aa		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 803 at offset 0x665E0 54 bytes
stream_096_off00057821.bin
225f31309db64707a970661c649c4e75e0030f13d1fb3d53986aac0074989dc4		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x57821 11268 bytes
icc_00_off0000233b.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x233B 3144 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.