Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8e54da122cec515f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.5 KB Created: 2021-06-26 20:20:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 281bb582b5e0892ccd334a506db61282 SHA-1: 787211b60379a76e8fad7107d0ab5217393ae184 SHA-256: 8e54da122cec515fdd0c029bd05bd674c035e66d5725e7e9d839059eaf1cb097
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous links to external websites, many hosted on compromised WordPress installations, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm behavior are consistent with techniques used to redirect users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9956

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://pappteam.hu/userfiles/file/38568367085.pdf
    • https://hsegroup.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/pdmccf8i3nvd8qtp5hpadmj3s6/24620827106.pdf
    • https://ipic.vn/userfiles/file/luxozefoke.pdf
    • http://doublehappyvstheinfinitesadness.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16079a41c23860---5048135210.pdf
    • http://www.hptindia.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160791d092d80e---kuzotonaganuge.pdf
    • https://sitebyside.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/51a6fbe5bbd2da296eea1a13cc3c9ec3/94497919240.pdf
    • https://shrmivirtual.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/83b6039213cb25c3987d569017353a13/xitemoj.pdf
    • https://kachhiproperties.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/qsb3i4p01nbrorrhugcjmln9h1/lasovejo.pdf
    • http://wildpflanzen-planung.de/file/gitivabu.pdf
    • http://guitarenko.fr/img/files/tesafax.pdf
    • https://www.actionconstructionjax.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ff4d01ac61b2fe546a5e81055e2dbf09/vupeziwop.pdf
    • https://gaseg.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6pql8kboddfuca8350isvo8fji/86590056294.pdf
    • http://gongotour.com/FileData/ckfinder/files/20210623_9BFB17D17DF8E4E4.pdf
    • http://hanasushipickup.com/uploads/files/10749463671.pdf
    • http://akcjonariusz.com/UserFiles/file/47777172979.pdf
    • https://cananalimdar.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/h60mhm33a8haa7anb5lhmndti4/71250215907.pdf
    • https://www.hontoys.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/o7qpffpuvhvlbj1g07b0l4mruj/nezamuxezagafiwijalegu.pdf
    • http://www.insurancedirectcanada.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160abc9527be1f---6293386541.pdf
    • http://tandartsindex.nl/images/uploads/voxexuru.pdf
    • http://gwhs79.com/clients/867100/File/fotojifejogupawiwep.pdf
    • http://studioego.cz/userfiles/file/27922153330.pdf
    • https://sarujiovalente.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/itqlio8m36vrc1532bqecvg6a9/fimolotejatukutubux.pdf
    • https://gamletaarnhuset.no/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a371de54d23---62966302179.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/PmAiG5ZyT-k/uplcv?utm_term=1+foot+to+metric
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ed08.bin
779413fe551c1eb98a0c475211a2c5f14a4352087e5ddd49ab4e58a81de2fafe
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xED08 9972 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010321.bin
1ee7248d024d33af88a0bae982e83dec891a8e68c362882a18242eed097981b6
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10321 17212 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012f8c.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12F8C 16792 bytes